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Executive Summary  
 
The 2009 Black Saturday Bushfires in Victoria, Australia killed 173 people and affected 
430,000 hectares of land.  Before communities could begin to rebuild the tonnes of burnt and 
potentially hazardous debris had to be removed.  This report reviews the overall waste 
management process following the bushfires.  In particular the report focuses on the State 
and Commonwealth sponsored demolition and debris removal contract.  Data for the 
analysis is based on a literature review and interviews with professionals and community 
members involved with or affected by the bushfire waste.   
 
Overall the demolition and debris removal response to the Bushfires was successful.  The 
government sponsored clean-up was hailed as the best post-bushfire government initiative.  
Aspects of the clean-up programme such as the opportunity to salvage personal items before 
demolition were highly successful. 
 
Although there had been little prior planning for how to deal with disaster waste on this scale, 
there was a collective response to move with urgency towards a common goal: to remove 
public health hazards and to get communities into the rebuilding process as quickly as 
possible.   
 
To meet this goal, five key decisions were made: 
• Establishment of VBRRA. 
• Single waste classification for waste handling procedures. 
• Decision for government to fund the demolition and debris removal on private 
property. 
• Letting a single contract for the above works. 
• Construction of a new landfill cell. 
 
For each decision, decision makers needed to balance the environmental, economic and 
social drivers to meet the above goal.  For example a decision was made to stream-line 
standard peace-time processes such as asbestos handling and disposal in order to remove 
the hazard quickly and facilitate the rebuild.  With limited time to assess possible impacts and 
outcomes for decisions there was inevitably an elevated risk due to uncertainty associated 
with the decision-making.  
 
The legal frameworks used to meet the debris and demolition requirements were simple and 
effective.  The organisational structures in this event were unplanned for but collaborative 
and efficient.  The major deficiency identified was the lack of ‘peace-time’ solid waste 
managers involved in the decision-making process on the waste management strategy.  
 
The reactive response to the Bushfire clean-up was largely successful, however, the 
response would have benefited from greater prior planning.  Planning is necessary to give 
decision-makers the tools and information necessary to make good decisions after any given 
event.  Flexible organisational, legal and financial frameworks and suitable impact 
assessment techniques are essential.  For example pre-determining the extent of public 
financial assistance to the public, relative to disaster impact, and providing prosecution 
protection for decision- makers, would help to reduce pressure on decision-makers at the 
time of the disaster.  With these in place, decisions can be made more efficiently and in a 
well coordinated and consultative manner.  Many of the delays in the Bushfire response 
could have been avoided if pre-event planning, focussed around anticipated decision points, 
had been carried out.  Communication at all levels is the key component of this entire 
process. 
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It is hoped that those involved in waste management and other disaster responses take the 
lessons learned here and develop effective plans and strategies for responses in the future. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Black Saturday 
The 7 February 2009 “Black Saturday” bushfires in Victoria, Australia were the most 
devastating bushfires in Australian history (VBRRA, 2009a).  The fires were fuelled by severe 
drought conditions, record temperatures and high winds.  173 people were killed in 78 
communities and over 430,000 hectares of land and 2000 properties were destroyed 
(VBRRA, 2009a).  The properties affected included public and private; rural lifestyle; semi-
urban; commercial; farm; timber mills and forests; tourist complexes; and service towns.  
Some critical infrastructure (roads, power, fuel supply and telecommunications) suffered 
damage also.  Figure 1.1 shows the extent of the bushfires in Victoria which continued until 
23 February 2009.   
 
Due to the intense heat of the fires (up to 1200°C) (Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, 
2009) many of the affected buildings were reduced to a pile of twisted metal, masonry rubble 
and ash.   
 
  
Figure 1.1 Location of fires during the 2009 fire season (SMH, 2009) 
 
 
 
1.2 Report Scope 
This report introduces the issue of disaster waste management and outlines the methodology 
used during the case study data gathering and analysis.  A brief overview of the 2009 
Victorian Bushfires is provided and includes the response and the initial stages of the 
recovery.  The report then describes in more detail the disaster waste recovery process – 
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including demolition works, collection and disposal.  The final section of the report is an 
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the key waste management decisions.  It should 
be noted that the focus of the report is on the recovery phase, therefore waste management 
during the emergency response phase is commented on but not analysed in any detail.   
 
The report forms a case study of a modern disaster waste management system.  It will be 
used, by the authors, as part of a wider study on disaster waste management systems and 
will in time be compared with other case studies to try and develop a strategic and integrated 
approach to planning for and responding to disaster waste.   
 
 
2 Disaster Waste Management Background 
Depending on their type and severity, and the nature of the built environment, disasters can 
create large volumes of inert and hazardous debris.  Recent natural disasters such as the 
2010 Haiti earthquake (Booth, 2010, Johnson and Correa, 2010, Kahn, 2010), Hurricane 
Katrina 2005 (Luther, 2008, USEPA, 2008, Brown and Milke, 2009),and the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami (Basnayake et al., 2005, Petersen, 2006) have all generated volumes of 
waste which overwhelmed existing solid waste capacities and required extraordinary 
management approaches. 
 
Disaster debris can impede rescuers and emergency services reaching survivors; inhibit 
provision of lifeline support; pose a public and environmental health hazard; and hinder the 
social and economic recovery of the affected area.  Poor management of a clean-up effort 
can result in a slow and costly recovery which is potentially risky to public and environmental 
health in both the short and long term.   
 
The first and most comprehensive national guidance on disaster debris management was the 
USEPA’s “Planning for Disaster Debris” (USEPA, 1995) which was updated in 2008 
(USEPA, 2008).  Most US local government authorities now have plans due to recovery cost 
incentives provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (USEPA, 2008).  
Outside the US, understanding of the need to plan for debris management is growing 
(Johnston et al., 2009, JEU, 2010). 
Due to the destructive nature of fires, they typically leave less debris than other disasters 
(USEPA, 1995).  There are few documented accounts of waste management following fire 
events, those reported include the 1991 Oakland firestorm (State of California, 1997), 1993 
Malibu, California, coastal fires (USEPA, 1995), 2000 Cerro Grande wildfires (USEPA, 2008) 
and 2003 Cedar and Pines Fires, San Diego (County of San Diego, 2005).  A range of waste 
management options were employed across these disaster responses (largely due to varied 
environmental and public health hazard assessments), including private property clearance 
by property owner; local government facilitated cleanups; a combination of insurance, federal 
and local government funding; and mixed efforts to recycle. 
 
 
Establishing a solid waste management system in ‘peace’ time is a complex challenge – 
balancing stakeholder desires, community needs, environmental factors and political will.  
Adding a disaster to the challenge adds another level of complexity by introducing extremely 
large volumes of debris, time pressures and a shocked community.   
  
3 Methodology 
3.1 Literature Review 
This case study is developed from both pre-disaster contextual information and post-
disaster reporting.  Documents cited for contextual information include websites, laws 
and statutes, design guidelines, reports – all mainly government produced.  Post 
disaster literature, specific to the 2009 Victorian Bushfires, has been limited.  Again 
the main information sources included government status reports, websites, and 
public information brochures.  Some newspaper articles have also been cited.  At the 
time of writing there was limited relevant research material published on the Victorian 
Bushfires.   
 
 
3.2 Field Data 
Two data gathering trips to the Victorian Bushfire region were carried out.  The first, 
in August 2009, was approximately 6 months after the disaster event.  The main aim 
of this trip was to talk to professionals involved in the debris removal and waste 
management work to gain an understanding of the processes involved.  The second, 
in March 2010 was approximately 13 months after the disaster.   The aim of this trip 
was to talk to community members about how they viewed the bushfire clean-up 
process and how it had affected their overall recovery.  
 
3.2.1 Professional Interviews 
In total, eight professionals involved in the waste management process (including 
contractors, private waste firms, council waste managers, government regulators and 
disaster managers) were interviewed using a semi-structured interview approach.  
The interviews were approximately one hour long and included questions relating to 
the following main areas: 
 
• Disaster waste nature / composition etc 
• Initial assessments of disaster waste 
• Existing waste management system 
• Organisational structure of the disaster waste management response 
• Property owners responsibility / involvement in clean-up (if any) 
• Demolition process 
• Disaster waste collection system used 
• Disaster waste recycling 
• Disaster waste disposal 
• Timeline and priorities of waste management activities 
• Reconstruction 
• Costs 
• Economic impact of disaster waste presence 
• Legal structures around disaster waste management 
 
The interviews were recorded and a transcript was made available to interview 
participants to review and amend if necessary.  All interviewers agreed to be named 
in connection with information provided. 
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3.2.2 Community Interviews 
Community interviews were also semi-structured interviews (based on the 
questionnaire described in Section 3.2.3) lasting approximately 1 hour.  In total 14 
interviews were carried out. 
 
Interview participants were identified through community support groups.  While this 
potentially introduced a level of bias or demographic skew, this was an important 
step to reduce the potential for traumatised persons to be interviewed.  It was felt that 
the demographic questions included in the interviews may be able to determine if 
there were any groups excluded and the results could be presented with this 
limitation in mind.  However, it was felt that due to the sensitive nature of disaster 
research, this sort of potential bias, particularly in a small sample, is unavoidable  
 
Community interviews were primarily with affected residents from Marysville, 
Taggerty and Kinglake. 
 
 
3.2.3 Community Questionnaire 
To try and cover a larger bushfire area, and to endeavour to gain a broader cross 
section of affected population, anonymous, confidential questionnaires were also 
used.  Six questionnaires were distributed by the lead researcher at the time of the 
reconnaissance to individuals identified by the community but who did not want to 
carry out an interview.  Questionnaires were also left at two of the temporary 
accommodation villages (for those displaced by the Bushfires), however, no 
questionnaires were completed. 
 
The questionnaire used a mixture of Likert scale responses and open-ended 
questions.  The questionnaire covered the following broad areas: 
• Respondent demographics (including personal and property details) 
• Property damage 
• Time line of clean-up activities 
• Financial and in-kind assistance received 
• Insurance 
• Individual clean-up carried out 
• Loss of income 
• Preparation and planning 
• Environment 
• Public health and safety 
 
Due to the low number of responses – no statistical conclusions could be drawn from 
the information.  However, rich, qualitative data from the six responses has been 
analysed alongside the interview data. 
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4 The Overall Bushfire Response 
4.1 Emergency Response 
Emergency Management in Victoria is guided by the Emergency Management Act 
(1986).  The State has a State Emergency Response Plan which was enacted at the 
time of the fires and municipal councils have their own Municipal Emergency 
Response Plans to guide emergency responses at Shire level.  The County Fire 
Authority, State Emergency Service and Department of Sustainability and the 
Environment all also had major roles in the Bushfire response.  The major activities in 
the emergency response were fire fighting, evacuation, community welfare centres 
and restoration of damaged critical infrastructure. 
 
Interim findings from the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission inquiry (2009) have 
revealed a number of serious deficiencies in the emergency response during the 
Black Saturday fires which will need to be reviewed.  Public information and warning 
systems, in particular, were deemed inadequate.  Delayed warnings and overloaded 
information forums (phone and internet) meant communities did not have accurate 
information on the location and severity of the fires.  The ‘stay or go’ policy has also 
received criticism that the degree of risk in staying and defending are not fully 
understood by the public. 
 
Due to the destructive nature of bushfires, debris had very limited, if any impact on 
emergency service provision.  The largest risk to emergency workers in the bushfires 
was some dangerous structures and trees and the potential for exposure to airborne 
and aqueous and hazardous substances. 
 
 
4.2 Recovery 
Victoria has a State Emergency Recovery Plan (SERP) (Emergency Management in 
Victoria, 2005) which outlines roles and responsibilities in emergency recovery.  
Generally recovery is delegated to community level with state level support.  
However, on 10 February 2009 the Commonwealth and Victorian Governments, due 
to the scale of the disaster, elected to establish the Victorian Bushfire Recovery and 
Reconstruction Authority (VBRRA).  The role of VBRRA was to guide the recovery 
and rebuild process, including management and distribution of funds.  In addition to 
VBRRA, community recovery committees (CRC) were set up in each affected 
community (partly elected and partly Council appointed) to plan and direct recovery 
planning in their community.  CRC’s are entities which are identified in the SERP.  
 
The overarching aim of VBRRA is “to help regions, towns and individuals to rebuild 
and recover in a way that is safe, timely, efficient, cost effective and respectful of 
those different needs”.  To achieve this VBRRA work with government departments, 
councils, businesses, CRCs etc to develop and implement local rebuilding plans 
(VBRRA, accessed 2010). 
 
Temporary accommodation was one of the most pressing tasks for recovery 
authorities.  From one month after Black Saturday temporary villages were set up in 
the hardest hit areas such as Kinglake, Marysville and Flowerdale to house displaced 
persons.  The Kinglake temporary village is shown in Figure 4.1.  Other 
accommodation options included rental accommodation, caravan or shed 
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Aside from accommodation provision, the first tangible task that VBRRA undertook 
was the demolition and debris removal of all buildings destroyed by the bushfires.  
This project was implemented by an Australia construction company called Grocon 
and is discussed in further detail in Section 5.2.  The clean-up works were completed 
in 6 months. 
 
  
Figure 4.1 Temporary housing complex in Kinglake 
 
 
4.3 Rebuilding 
Despite state and commonwealth governments (through VBRRA) offering varying 
financial and in-kind support and the stream-lining of planning and building permitting 
processes (Victorian Government, 2009), by March 2010, very little reconstruction 
had commenced in the hardest hit areas of Kinglake and Marysville. 
 
Community members and authorities we spoke to cited the following reasons for the 
slow progress of reconstruction / readiness of residents to commit to rebuilding, 
including: 
• A yet-to-be released Royal Commission report on the cause of the bushfires 
and an investigation into planning for and mitigating future fires.  The final 
report is due in July 2010. 
• Under or no insurance and lengthy processes for state government 
compensation. 
• New building regulations (released on 11 March 2009) in fire risk have raised 
building prices (in most cases above insured house value) 
• Uncertainty around the commercial future of businesses in some areas 
(Marysville in particular) 
• A number of non-returnees (due to trauma and slow provision of temporary or 
permanent housing). 
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5 Disaster Waste Management 
5.1 Waste Streams 
5.1.1 Initial assessment 
An initial environmental assessment of the waste matrix was carried out by the 
Victorian Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (covering environmental aspects) 
and the State Department of Human Services (health and safety) on request from the 
State Government.   
 
Debris was generated from a range of private (residential, farm etc), public (toilet 
blocks, schools, water tanks, reserves, bridges etc) and commercial (motels, shops 
etc) properties.   
 
The waste matrix included: 
• Mixed ash 
• Concrete rubble and bricks 
• Partially burnt dimensional timber and fence posts (treated) 
• Metal 
• Vegetation and trees 
• Household hazardous wastes 
• Vehicles 
• Corpses (human corpses removed by Coroner) 
 
 
5.1.2 Hazardous substances 
The main hazardous wastes identified in the debris were asbestos, chromated 
copper arsenate (CCA) (largely in fencing) and household hazardous wastes such as 
oil, fridges, electrical and electronic appliances, fuel, explosives, refrigerant, poisons 
and pesticides.  However, due to the intense heat of the fires, the EPA believed that 
many of the hazardous substances present were likely to have been volatilised (or in 
the case of asbestos, reconstituted into a non-friable form).  Residues may have 
been present in the ash. 
 
For simplicity and expedience in the clean-up, all waste was considered to be 
contaminated to some degree (refer Section 5.1.4).  No laboratory testing was 
carried out on the waste.  Some air monitoring was carried out  
 
The State and Commonwealth government recognised the hazardous waste 
materials (in particular asbestos with its significant public health risk) as a hazard 
within 3 days of Black Saturday and called for a stop to property clearance until 
appropriate procedures could be put in place.  Prior to this decision some local 
authorities had offered advice to residents on handling of hazardous waste such as 
asbestos. 
 
 
5.1.3 Additional waste streams 
Some additional waste streams were generated during the emergency response and 
had to be included in the waste management process: 
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• Excess in-kind donations (such as clothing, bedding, household goods etc) - 
up to 15-20 tonnes per week at the peak reducing to 1-2 tonne per week 6 
months after the event. 
• Increased volumes of household recyclables (individual food packages, water 
bottles etc) from emergency relief centres and temporary villages. 
 
 
5.1.4 Waste Classification 
In line with the initial assessment a decision was made, by EPA and DHS, to give the 
waste a single classification, called “Bushfire Waste”.  Using Section 30A of the 
Victorian Environmental Protection Act, 1970, the EPA was able to develop handling, 
transportation and disposal methods specific to the bushfire waste to expedite 
recovery and minimise hazards to persons and environment.  The Bushfire waste 
was broadly categorised as Construction & Demolition waste plus other 
contaminants.  Section 30A was activated one month after Black Saturday. 
 
In addition, a Dangerous Goods Order (Victorian Government Gazette, 2009) was 
issued on 16 February 2009 under Section 55 of the Dangerous Goods Act, 1985, to 
set out protection methods for minimising asbestos exposure.   The Order stated this 
action was necessary to be “expedient for the public safety”.  The Section 30A and 
Section 55 both advised that all waste be handled and disposed of as Class B (see 
below) asbestos waste. 
 
In accordance with the Occupational Health and Safety Regulations, Class B 
asbestos is classified as non-friable asbestos-containing material.  Specialised 
personal protective equipment (PPE) and a Class B asbestos removal licence is 
required to handle any material with this classification (Victorian Government, 2007). 
 
Section 30A and Section 55 legal provisions are included in Appendix B. 
 
 
5.2 State and Commonwealth demolition and debris removal 
programme 
5.2.1 Funding 
On the 27th of February 2009, the Commonwealth and Victorian Government 
announced that it would jointly pay and facilitate the demolition and debris disposal of 
buildings destroyed by the bushfires as debris removal was considered a vital task in 
facilitating the recovery process.  The time goal for demolition and debris removal 
completion was six months. 
 
“Ms [Jenny] Macklin [Federal Minister for Families, Housing, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs] said clearing debris left in the wake of 
Victoria’s bushfires was the essential first step in rebuilding communities.  
‘We will remove potential hazardous material, such as asbestos, and then 
clear properties for free, so communities can start to get back on their feet,’ 
she said.  ‘When you see the scale …[of] the devastation and people sifting 
through what was their homes, it is clear the pressing priority, both at an 
emotional and safety level, [is] to start clearing away the debris.  We want to 
help people get started as quickly as we can, and we want to give them the 
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practical assistance they need to make sure the clean up is done in a safe 
and sensitive way.’ “  
(The Premier of Victoria, 2009) 
 
Clean-up tasks would ordinarily rest with municipalities and private property owners.  
The State Emergency Recovery Plan (Emergency Management in Victoria, 2005) 
states that municipalities are responsible for clean-up activities.  Generally this would 
be limited to public property clearance and potentially some additional kerbside 
collection services for affected properties.  Costs incurred by municipalities during the 
process would be claimable through various established disaster funding 
mechanisms (see Section 5.3.2).  Private property owners are responsible for 
clearing their own properties by private funds or through insurance.   
 
There is a mechanism for states to gain national funding assistance for state wide 
natural disaster responses: The Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements 
(NDRRA).  Private property clearance as well as public property debris removal 
works can be claimed back by states through NDRRA (Australian Government, 
2007).  
 
Several additional grants were made available specifically following the Bushfires.  
These included: an alternative funding grant for primary producers (Rural Finance, 
2009) to assist with clean-up activities and business restoration; and for residential 
land owners (Victorian Bushfire Appeal Fund, 2010) for dangerous tree removal.   
 
 
5.2.2 Contract and scope 
The State government elected to let a single “managing contract” to coordinate the 
demolition and debris removal process for all buildings destroyed in the bushfires.  
Approximately 2 weeks after Black Saturday the government called for capability 
statements from the building sector.  Contractors had 24 hours to prepare a tender 
with unit rates and an estimated budget.  Within a week (3 weeks after the event) 
Grocon was announced as the Managing Contractor for the clean-up works.  It was 
felt that a construction company, such as Grocon, would have the systems and 
networks in place to mobilise quickly and carry out the works effectively.  Grocon 
elected to submit a ‘not for profit’ cost-reimbursement tender based on their staff 
hourly rates.  Grocon were to be reimbursed for approved subcontracts.  A small 
percentage for overheads was also included.  A Contract Administrator was 
appointed under the umbrella of VBRRA.  
 
The scope of the Grocon contract was for demolition and debris removal from any 
private or public building – house, factory, shed, etc – destroyed by the fires.  This 
was limited to the footprint of the building and did not extend to fencing or trees.   
 
The author is aware of at least one formal proposal to government from the 
community to manage the clean-up themselves.  The proposal used a local labour 
approach and included for all materials to be disposed and recycled within the area.  
 
5.2.3 Personnel 
To staff the project Grocon sourced 48 people internally (most of who volunteered to 
be involved) and then recruited an additional 24 people to make a 72 person team.  
No staff in the Grocon team had previous experience in waste management. 
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Grocon divided their staff into 7 project teams to cover 10 regions.  In each project 
team Grocon established a temporary office (at location agreed with the local 
Council) and the following personnel:  
• project manager 
• community liaison officer (often local to area) 
• occupational health and safety officer 
• site manager 
• site supervisor  
• contracts administrator 
 
Counsellors were also employed to emotionally help staff working in the affected 
area and there were regular debriefing sessions. 
 
The remainder of the personnel and equipment requirements (demolition, truck 
drivers, trucks, asbestos removal contractors, environmental hygienists, landfills etc) 
were subcontracted.  Approximately 70% of subcontracts (and 50% of the labour) 
were sourced from the local community to minimise resentment of the local 
community toward outside contractors and to maximise employment and economic 
benefits to the affected communities.  Many local contractors did not have 
appropriate health and safety / asbestos management accreditation so free training 
courses for this were provided.  However, some communities felt that the efforts to 
include local labour were either not sufficient or the training requirements and long 
work hours required were prohibitive.   
 
 
5.2.4 The clean-up process 
All property owners who wanted their buildings demolished and disposed of had to 
register through VBRRA via phone or internet.  Property owners that had cleared 
their properties before the announcement that demolition works would be paid for by 
government, were eligible to apply for reimbursement.  Management of the register 
was officially carried out by VBRRA, with much of the day to day management of the 
register being carried out by Grocon for expedience.  Only a handful of affected 
properties elected not to register for the clean-up service. 
 
In total, over 3000 properties were registered.  The majority were residential 
properties but there were also some commercial properties, schools, churches, 
police stations etc.  
 
Once registered, there were four key steps involved in site clearance as identified 
and publicised by the Premier’s Office of Victoria: 
1. The Coroner with Victoria Police approve access to the site;  
2. Site assessment for risk, and removal of risks such as burnt gas bottles, 
dangerous trees, unstable chimneys;  
3. Site owners given an opportunity for a final recovery of any possessions at 
the site; and  
4. Site cleared by licensed contractors.  
(The Premier of Victoria, 2009) 
 
While these key steps remained the essence of the demolition and debris removal 
process, a series of more detailed steps were developed by the Contractor. These 
steps are shown as a flow diagram in Figure 5.1 and are described in detail below. 
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 Figure 5.1 Site management process diagram 
 
 
As discussed, all property owners who wanted to take advantage of the scheme had 
to register their properties with VBRRA.  As the registrations were received, Grocon 
tried to prioritise the works as much as possible (refer Section 5.2.5).  However, site 
access was restricted to areas cleared by the Coroner.  In the case of Marysville, the 
entire town was locked down for Coronary investigations for 6-8 weeks.   
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Once access was gained, Grocon employed a surveyor to verify that they were 
working on the correct property.  Once verified a sign was erected with property ID, 
contractor and safety information on it and barrier tape was placed around the 
property with an approximately 10m buffer.  Pre-demolition photos were also taken. 
 
Following that, an environmental hygienist would establish on site with fibre 
monitoring equipment.  The equipment was used primarily for monitoring air-borne 
asbestos fibres. 
 
A meeting was then arranged and held between a Grocon liaison officer and the 
property owner before any demolition works took place.  The meeting objectives 
were to define the scope of the works, any special requirements (including property 
items that they did not want demolished or removed such as bricks, foundations, 
items with personal value etc) and to determine the demolition works’ timing.  A 
consent form with a defined scope (including 3 parts: checklist of hazardous items 
present; scope of demolition; and special requirements) was prepared and signed by 
the property owner. 
 
Following removal (by Grocon) of any hazardous items from site, all property owners 
were given the opportunity to access their properties under safe conditions, including 
the wearing of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), to recover any personal 
belongings (referred to as site ‘discovery’).  Property owners recovered / elected to 
salvage and keep a wide range of goods from diamond rings to bricks and burnt 
dolls.  By all accounts this aspect of the debris removal programme was invaluable to 
ensure community satisfaction with the debris removal process.  Frank Bortoletto, 
Grocon’s joint executive project manager for the clean-up, described the personal 
belonging recovery as “a very important step”.   
 
The site was cleared of debris.  Then an environmental hygienist would come and 
visually inspect the site to certify that all potential contaminated material had been 
removed from the site (no soil samples taken) and the surveyor returned to take post-
demolition photos.  Property owners were then invited to inspect the property again. 
 
Grocon would then seek a practical completion certificate from VBBRA.  These 
certificates provided a record of the works.  Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 show the 
Marysville Medical Clinic site before and after demolition and debris removal. 
 
All parts of the demolition and collection process were documented including time, 
waste volumes, truck and personnel information and recorded in a day book which 
was then entered into a master spreadsheet / database.  The comprehensive record 
keeping ensured full transparency and accountability for the government funded 
operations.   
 
As with any large scale project, there were reports that various steps and processes 
were not followed on every site.  The description above represents the intended, and 
largely the process followed, during the clean-up.  Micro-level anomalies are not the 
focus of this report. 
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Figure 5.2 The Maysville Medical Clinic before demolition and debris removal (Photo 
credit: Dr. Lachlan Fraser) 
 
 Figure 5.3 The Marysville Medical Clinic after demolition and debris removal (Photo 
credit: Dr. Lachlan Fraser) 
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Grocon had to reverse their thinking on site management because usually 
contractors build a fence and control a site, but here Grocon were working in the 
community on someone’s property.  
 
“We treat every owner like they’re the project manager” (F. Bortoletto, Grocon) 
 
“this wasn’t a single project – it turned out to be 3000 individual projects because 
every single property is somebody’s home, every single property is a story, every 
single property is … part of an individual’s or a family’s or someone’s road to 
recovery and dealing with [the fire]… every single one had individual needs” (T. 
Bamford, VBBRA Contract Administrator) 
 
 
5.2.5 Work scheduling 
At the start of the demolition works Grocon was keen to start work as quickly as 
possible.  Providing access and appropriate authorisation were not obstacles, the 
first priorities set by Grocon and VBRRA were:  
• Schools 
• Community buildings 
• Petrol stations 
 
After these building types, priority was based on maximising demolition work 
efficiency by area and anticipating potential access issues due to rain.  Grocon were 
also dependent on property owners determining when they were ready to have works 
carried out.  On average the demolition process took 4.3 days per property (ranging 
from 1 day to 2 weeks). 
 
Approximately 40 properties had still not been cleared 6 months after Black 
Saturday.  This was due to several reasons: 
1. traumatised residents not ready to have their properties cleared 
2. deceased estates with legal problems concerning property ownership  
3. access or remoteness (e.g. beyond broken bridges, rain affected 
accessways) 
4. uncontactable owners (overseas, hospitalised etc) 
 
 
5.2.6 Health & Safety 
As stated in Section 5.1.4 Health and Safety was a key concern in determining waste 
management procedures. 
 
It was assumed that there were significant risks in terms of exposure to asbestos and 
hazardous substances.  Workers and property owners were supplied with protective 
clothing before entering the site.  The Department of Human Services (DHS) 
coordinated a public safety campaign to provide information for affected property 
owners.  The service included provision of “fossicker” kits (including masks, gloves 
etc) to allow residents to salvage personal belongings from their homes (VBRRA, 
2009a), see Figure 5.4.  Signage and barricades were also used to identify and 
isolate the site. 
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 Figure 5.4 PPE provided to residents for salvaging of personal belongings (Photo Source: Dr 
Lachlan Fraser) 
 
Asbestos monitoring was carried out on every site throughout the clean-up process 
(by EPA in collaboration with DHS) and no instances of detectable air-borne 
asbestos were found (VBRRA, 2009a).  Truck drivers unions also got involved in 
health and safety issues and lobbied for a number of protection measures for drivers.  
All trucks were operated with windows closed, and air conditioning on re-circulate to 
minimise exposure.  And to reduce risk to truck drivers and landfill operators 
receiving the asbestos waste all trucks eventually had to have auto-release doors for 
waste release. 
 
According to Grocon there were three loss time injuries on the project.  These 
incidents occurred to truck drivers driving on the Black Spur Road – a narrow, windy 
road that connects Melbourne with the bushfire area.  Initially Grocon tried to 
introduce slower truck speeds, slow vehicle bays, new truck inspection requirements 
and restrictions on any persons working double shifts (or two jobs) etc in 
collaboration with Victoria Roads and Victoria Police.  But ultimately an urgency 
developed to find an alternate disposal site to the north of Melbourne (refer Section 
0).  According to community members there were many near misses on the Black 
Spur Road during this time and there was general relief when the alternate disposal 
site was opened and the trucks were diverted. 
 
 
5.2.7 Communication 
Communication with the public was largely reactionary and uncoordinated and 
resulted in a lot of mis-information.  A range of communication strategies were 
established by VBRRA (newsletters, community outreach, SMS messaging etc) to 
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inform the scattered affected population, however, most of the affected persons 
interviewed did not feel they were well communicated with. 
 
Many residents were initially unaware of the State and Commonwealth Government 
sponsored clean-up scheme and were confused about the clean-up process.  
Bortoletto found that community meetings were the most effective way to share 
information as many people did not have access to phones, computers or 
newspapers.  Bortoletto also noted that as communities saw the demolition and 
debris removal works in progress more registrations for debris removal work were 
lodged.  It is unclear whether this was due to awareness of the programme or a 
better understanding and trust in the debris removal process. 
 
Bortoletto expressed that upfront communication with the community was one of the 
key components in the success of this programme.   
 
 
5.2.8 Demolition 
Most demolition was carried out using heavy plant.  However, some demolition was 
carried out by hand especially if protection of some item of personal property was 
requested by property owners. 
 
As part of the demolition works, the top 100mm of soil was excavated and disposed 
of to minimise potential residual soil contamination from ash deposits.  Thus a large 
percentage of total waste to landfill was soil. 
 
 
5.2.9 Transportation 
As part of the waste classification process (refer Section 5.1.4) Grocon was required 
to get a Section 30A approval from EPA for cartage of the material.  Requirements 
for 30A approval included: 
• fully sealed tail gates and top, 
• tarpaulins  
• spill kits, 
• being roadworthy (in consultation with VicRoads) 
 
All trucks (mostly semis, truck and trailers) were certified through a sticker process to 
identify approved bushfire waste vehicles.  Trucks without stickers were not allowed 
to accept waste from any site or to dispose of waste at any landfill.  EPA gave 
Grocon authority to manage this process through the 30A approval.  EPA carried out 
some audits early on and was satisfied with the procedures in place. 
 
On each site an area would be cleared (of contamination) for the debris trucks to 
drive onto.  All water used for washing and wetting down the demolition site and 
recovered materials was trucked in or sourced for free from local golf club and 
residential dams.   
 
Up to 600 trucks were engaged (from both large and independent truck operators) to 
assist with waste removal works.  According to Whelan (EPA) you could not get 
another truck during this time. 
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5.2.10 Recycling 
Very little separation of debris was possible due to the risk of asbestos exposure and 
the burnt nature of debris.  It took one to two weeks for Grocon to establish recycling 
processes (including securing a market and recycling rates) and during that time all 
debris was taken to landfill. 
 
Eventually all metals and most concrete was recycled.  All recyclables had to be 
washed and cleaned before removal from site.  11,650 tonnes of steel returned a 
cash profit of $1.6 million (VBRRA, 2010).  Concrete was disposed of for free at 
commercial recyclers.  Concrete was then generally crushed and used as an 
aggregate substitute for public and private works.  Proceeds from any recycling 
activities were invested back into the community through community recovery 
projects (VBRRA, 2010).   
 
Vegetation was largely mulched and stockpiled for communities to use for erosion 
protection.  Mulch supply, however, has exceeded demand and local authorities are 
concerned about the fire hazard associated with large stockpiles.  Existing mulch 
markets have also been overwhelmed.  Grocon arranged for local contractors to 
chop large trees into firewood for residents to use for free.    Any remaining organic 
material was burnt (burning is a permissible activity in Victoria in certain times of the 
year) (MFB & CFA, 2010).   
 
The author is aware of at least one proposal to establish a waste to energy facility to 
utilise (in the short term) the wood waste from the bushfires and in the long-term 
wood waste from the timber industry.  The proposal, however, was not adopted.    
 
Grocon tried to establish a recycling facility in one community to minimise 
transportation but the dust became an issue for the community so they returned to 
using existing recycling facilities. 
 
There was no requirement for Grocon to recycle materials.  Recycling was utilised 
because it made sense economically by reducing trucking and disposal costs, with 
the added benefit of reducing use of landfill space.  Bortoletto suggested that 
recycling was also motivated by Grocon’s company goals which include minimising 
environmental effects.  All profits from recycling were invested back into the 
community through various recovery projects, however, residents were largely 
unaware of this benefit. 
 
 
5.2.11 Disposal 
All non-recyclable debris was disposed of at landfill.  Any landfills wishing to accept 
bushfire classified waste were required to gain Section 30A approval (refer Section 
5.1.4 ).  Thirteen existing municipal solid waste landfills sought and were granted this 
approval but only four were used.   
 
Landfills in Victoria are owned both privately and publically.  Largely the affected 
local Councils were relieved to not have to take the bushfire debris.  The volumes 
involved would have been the equivalent of years worth of municipal waste in the 
respective municipalities. 
 
In total an estimated 380,000 tonnes waste was disposed of to landfill.   
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Existing Landfills 
As discussed in Section 5.1.4, EPA and DHS established standards (generally based 
on existing standards) for handling and disposal of bushfire waste.  Based on these 
standards, every landfill adopted individual operating procedures.   
 
It was assumed that Class B asbestos was present in every waste load.  Asbestos 
control procedures such as random air monitoring, material wet-down, minimise 
dozer handling were put in place.  For example at Sita Environmental’s Taylors Road 
landfill the entire operation was overseen by an environmental scientist and health 
and safety compliance officer.  Most waste handlers had already received external 
asbestos identification training.  There was some concern, however, that standards 
were not applied consistently over time and across different landfills.  
 
All debris was weighed and recorded against a property number for later 
reconciliation and payment. 
 
In most cases landfills were still receiving waste from other clients.  At Taylors Road 
landfill, for example, a separate tipping area was used for safety and to minimise 
disruption of existing customers and operations. 
 
Prior to EPA approval for Section 30A, Sita Environmental had to meet with their 
community engagement consultative committee to make sure there were no 
objections to receipt of bushfire waste.  The residents realised the importance of the 
bushfire clean-up process and were comforted by the presence and consultation with 
DHS/WorkSafe.  Fortunately the debris did not smell - which is a primary concern for 
landfill neighbours.   
 
New Landfill 
Due to several lost time injuries which occurred on the Black Spur Road (refer 
Section 5.2.6) and the cost involved in travelling such large distances between the 
affected area and the disposal sites, an alternate disposal site was sought.   
 
An existing but non-operational landfill site in Alexandra in Murrindindi Shire was 
identified as a potential disposal site for a bushfire waste disposal cell.  After initial 
resistance by the council, Grocon took over development and operation of the landfill 
cell for the remainder of the demolition works with the approval of EPA.   
 
In 10 days, Grocon: 
• Obtained a Section 30A on the Shire’s behalf  
• Designed the landfill cell (within 48 hours)1 
• Gained EPA approval 
• Removed 25,000 m³ of blasted rock to stockpile 
• Placed 10,000 m³ of clay liner (on site) 
• Laid the aggregate drainage layer 
• Installed a temporary weigh bridge 
• Made road improvements 
 
Typically the landfills receiving the bushfire waste were municipal waste landfills with 
synthetic liners (clay, bentofix, geofabric and aggregate drainage layer).  The new 
landfill cell had only a clay liner with aggregate drainage layer.  The site location, 
                                               
1 The initial design time estimate given by the Council contracted landfill designer was a 
minimum of 3 weeks. 
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geology and low risk of leachate generation due to the inert nature of the waste, led 
EPA to believe a clay-liner was adequate.  There were also existing controls in place 
(i.e. boreholes) at the landfill for environmental monitoring. 
 
The landfill was staffed with three people – gate keeper, foreman and the existing 
landfill digger / compactor driver.  Eventually the landfill accepted approximately 
40,000 m³ of bushfire waste (equal to approximately three years worth of landfill 
volume in this locality’s 50 year capacity landfill).  Air monitoring and groundwater 
monitoring at existing site boreholes were carried out by EPA and Grocon. 
 
There were some limitations with the new site especially given the smaller size of the 
facility.  These included limitations on truck size and increased wait times for 
disposal.  Grocon believe that the benefits of reducing the health and safety risk and 
the economic benefits of reducing haulage distances far outweighed these minor 
failings. 
 
When the operation was complete the landfill cell was capped and handed back to 
Murrindindi Shire.  The 30 year maintenance requirements for the landfill cell remain 
with the Shire.  According to Grocon and the EPA, Murrindindi Shire was satisfied 
with the overall outcome. 
 
Levies and disposal costs 
Most large landfills in Victoria are privately owned and waste disposal costs are not 
standardised.  Grocon was required to negotiate disposal costs for the bushfire waste 
with each landfill.  Most landfills provided substantially reduced rates.  If any operator 
would not lower their rates Grocon would not send waste to it.  Consequently 
disposal costs were, in general, noticeably reduced for bushfire waste.  Hanson Road 
landfill waived disposal fees during the emergency response (1-2 weeks).  Taylors 
Road landfill significantly reduced disposal costs for bushfire waste.   
 
State government (EPA) waste levies for landfill disposal were waived for all bushfire 
waste.   
 
Some individual Shires elected to waive tipping fees at their transfer or disposal 
facilities during the fires to facilitate green waste removal to reduce future fire risk. 
 
 
5.2.12 Cross-organisational liaison 
There was a lot of cross-organisational liaison in the initial stages of the operation – 
to establish programmes and procedures.  By all accounts good open relationships 
were developed.  Audits were carried out with decreasing frequency as the process 
continued and the various regulatory authorities were comfortable with the 
procedures in place and Grocon’s performance. 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the cross organisational structures involved in the bushfires waste 
management process.  A brief description of key relationships involved in the process 
is given below. 
 
. 
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EPA – VBRRA / state government 
EPA was initially approached by state government to facilitate the clean-up process 
by establishing waste handling procedures. 
 
EPA – DHS / Worksafe 
EPA and DHS (implemented through Worksafe) worked closely together to establish 
appropriate waste management procedures.  
 
Grocon – EPA and DHS / Worksafe 
Grocon liaised with both EPA and DHS to determine procedures for waste handling 
and disposal to ensure public, worker and environmental safety.  EPA and Worksafe 
also helped to police rogue contractors who were offering unauthorised clean-up 
services for cash.  Illegal dumping and inappropriate procedures were allegedly used 
by some of these contractors. 
 
Grocon - VBRRA / State Government 
Grocon was quickly handed almost full control of the clean-up process including day 
to day management of the property register.  Bortoletto described Grocon’s 
relationship with VBRRA/the government as an open relationship with “nothing to 
hide”. 
 
Grocon - Landfill operators 
Communication between landfill operators and Grocon was limited to negotiating 
disposal costs, advising of incoming waste and ascertaining appropriate licencing 
and capacity. 
 
EPA / Worksafe – Landfill operators 
Handling, disposal and operating procedures for landfills receiving bushfire waste 
were determined directly between EPA, DHS and the landfill operators.   
 
Grocon - Local government 
There was adequate communication between Grocon and local government.  Initial 
contact was made when establishing site offices and securing access to the area and 
following that there was on transportation routes and during consultation with local 
communities.  Local government carried out no monitoring of Grocon’s activity as this 
was assumed to be handled by state government. 
 
EPA - Local government 
In terms of debris, EPA provided advice on landfill levy waivers and hazardous 
material handling and disposal but otherwise there was little contact. 
 
VBRRA/State Government – Local government 
There was seemingly no involvement by local government in the strategic planning 
and/or implementation of the bushfire waste management programme. 
 
Community Recovery Committees (CRC) 
The CRC’s were established after the start of the clean-up programme, however, 
even after their establishment there was seemingly no formal consultation between 
the CRCs (or any community wide groups) and either the State / VBRRA or Grocon - 
in either the contract planning or implementation stages.  Most community level 
communication was either on an individual level or at isolated community meetings.    
This lack of consultation led to some dissatisfaction among community members 
(see Section 6.4.7). 
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5.3 Local authority waste management 
5.3.1 Emergency response 
In terms of debris and waste management the emergency response comprised road 
clearance, damage assessment to public properties and provision of municipal waste 
services for emergency centres (including volunteers, emergency workers and 
displaced residents). 
 
In Yarra Ranges Shire the initial response was to set up crews to assess damage to 
roads, bridges and trees.  Working groups were formed using personnel who 
ordinarily are responsible for the various assets like roads, bridges and buildings (as 
opposed to establishing a new group or organisational structure). 
 
Waste management for post-event waste generation at emergency centres 
(generated by displaced residents and emergency services) was arranged by 
municipalities as part of their emergency response either using existing waste 
management contractors and facilities or engaging commercial operators. 
 
No municipalities interviewed for this research covered private property clearance in 
their disaster management plans. 
 
 
5.3.2 Funding 
Any waste management activities (including relief centre waste collection and public 
property clearance) carried out as part of the emergency response and recovery 
effort by local government could be claimed back through the Natural Disaster 
Financial Assistance (NDFA).  Only public works can be claimed back through NDFA 
(Department of Treasury and Finance, 2009).  Insurance and alternative grants may 
also be sought by local authorities.   
 
 
5.3.3 Public property 
Local government is responsible for cleanup work on public property.  Any buildings 
damaged were eligible for cleanup under the Grocon contract.  However, some local 
councils elected to facilitate their own cleanup and subsequently apply for 
reimbursement through NDFA. 
 
 
5.3.4 Municipal waste collection 
In addition to the demolition and debris removal works for bushfire affected property, 
municipal waste collection had to continue for those still in the area.  Local councils 
continued their kerbside collection to unaffected properties as far as possible.  Road 
and area closures (for safety and coronary purposes) for up to 8 weeks caused some 
disruption to normal waste collection.  Where necessary, smaller vehicles or skip bins 
were used for municipal waste collection.  In areas closed for coroner investigations, 
the Army (through the federal initiated Defence Aid for Civil Communities response) 
provided some waste management assistance. 
 
Due to the number of people who (temporarily) moved out of area a lag was 
expected in the municipal waste volumes from: 
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1. Property clearance works outside the scope of the Grocon contract  
2. The return of pre-event municipal waste stream volumes.   
3. Additional waste from construction activities.   
 
The increase in waste from reconstruction and clearance may, however, be balanced 
by the reduction in people living in the area over this time. 
 
 
 
5.4 Individual property owners 
Individual property owners were responsible for any clean-up works outside the 
scope of the Grocon contract.  Payment for these works will either be through 
insurance, the dangerous tree grant (see Section 5.2.1) or private funds.   
 
Generally the public was unsure of what to do with the waste materials and were 
unwilling to pay to dispose of them at landfill.  Some illegal dumping occurrences 
have been reported.  CCA treated pine posts and wire, in particular, have reportedly 
been thrown into nature strips and waterways etc, causing an environmental and 
health and safety hazard.  Rural people will generally look to burn off debris which 
again is a potential health and safety and environmental risk.  Local councils advise 
the public on local law on burning restrictions and have advocated for VBRRA to 
intercept and provide more debris management services for collection of these 
wastes. 
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6 Disaster Waste Management 
 
The case study analysis follows the principles set out by Yin (2009) in Case Study 
Research, Design and Methods.  The framework for the analysis is to form a case 
description of the waste management process using strategic decision points as the 
unit of analysis.  These decision points determined the path and in turn overall 
success of the waste management process and it is likely that many of these same 
decision points will also be faced by future disaster waste managers.  Being able to 
anticipate what decisions will have to be made, what the likely impacts of the 
decision will be, how to better make these decisions and what information is needed 
to do so will help position communities to respond better in the future.  The analysis 
was informed by both interviews and the study of pre and post-disaster literature. 
 
A diagram summarising the decision-making associated with the waste management 
process is shown in Figure 6.1.  The diagram is a chronological account (although 
not to scale) and shows the events that occurred (star shape), the activities that took 
place (rectangular boxes), the decisions that were made (diamonds) and any delays 
that occurred (vertical parallel lines).  The diagram is also divided into 3 levels (local 
authority, state government and individual) to indicate who undertook the decisions 
and/or activities.  Arrows are used to show the flow through the diagram. 
.The analysis concentrates on the five key decision points of the Bushfire waste 
management process (denoted by the diamond shaped boxes in Figure 6.1).  For 
each key decision the analysis focuses on: the decision-making process (how and 
why the decision was made); the delays associated with the decision; the 
organisational aspects of the decision; the legal constraints; and the environmental, 
economic and social effects (both positive and negative).  The ultimate aim of this 
case study is to use these categories and the technique of pattern matching (Yin, 
2009) in a cross case study analysis of waste management programmes.  The 
analysis will determine the major drivers and barriers for waste management 
decisions and will lead to a framework for future disaster waste management.   
 
With limited data available from the waste management process (for example, data 
from the waste matrix (in terms of hazardous substances, contaminants, quantities 
etc.), costs and social assessments), it is difficult to quantitatively assess the 
environmental, economic and social impact of the waste management processes.  
However, relative (to peace-time standards or status quo) qualitative assessments of 
the strengths and weaknesses of each key decision can be made. 
 
For the purposes of this report and in line with New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence 
and Emergency Recovery guidelines (MCDEM, 2005) environmental effects include 
direct effects on the natural and built environment including: natural resource 
degradation and/or depletion; waste pollution; amenity values; biodiversity and 
ecosystems; buildings and infrastructure.  The environmental effects may have 
secondary effects on human health through contamination of waterways, soil etc.  
Social effects look at direct effects on human safety and wellbeing, health and 
welfare which in terms of waste will largely include direct disease or health threat 
from the waste and health and safety issues related to handling of the waste. 
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6.1 Decision 1: Establishment of VBRRA 
6.1.1 Decision-making process 
The decision to establish VBRRA was made by the Victorian Government to oversee, 
coordinate and give a focal point to the recovery and rebuilding following the Black Saturday 
bushfires.  The decision to form this Authority was not directly related to management of the 
bushfire waste, however, it is included here as VBRRA forms the umbrella of the entire 
disaster recovery system which debris management forms a part. 
 
The aim of VBRRA was to act as a Coordinator for the 3 levels of Government and the 
community or the Community Recovery Committees.  However, as the recovery has 
advanced, community members interviewed expressed growing discontentment about 
VBRRA’s role.  Many feel that VBRRA has added a layer of bureaucracy and that the 
recovery decision-making has been taken away from the communities.   
 
In this section the role of VBRRA is considered with respect to debris management only.    
 
 
6.1.2 Delays 
It is unclear if the timing of the establishment of VBRRA had any impact on the waste 
management system. 
 
6.1.3 Organisational aspects 
In peace-time in Victoria, municipal waste management is largely carried out by local 
authorities using kerbside collection systems, recycling and disposal at landfill.  Various 
governing bodies are responsible for regulating and directing waste management practices 
including: 
• Victoria EPA – regulating disposal and transportation 
• Sustainability Victoria – setting recycling targets etc 
• Regional Waste Management Groups (RWMGs)– coordinate waste management and 
education 
• Municipal Association of Victoria – coordinating RWMGs 
• Local authorities 
• Department of Human Services – public health & safety 
• Worksafe – health & safety in the workplace 
 
In essence the ‘peace-time’ waste management system is regulated at State level and 
implemented by local government.     
 
If a central authority had not been established it is unclear where the overall responsibility 
and strategic management for the bushfire waste would have rested amongst the diverse 
range of private, state and local government bodies involved in daily waste management in 
Victoria.  A single authority allowed for a strategic and centralised approach to waste 
management to be established.  VBRRA was responsible and ultimately accountable for 
ensuring the clean-up works were complete and implemented effectively and efficiently.    
 
In theory, VBRRA acted as a coordination body for state government waste regulators and 
private organisations involved in the waste management process.  In this case, however, this 
coordination role was more or less taken over by the managing contractor Grocon - with the 
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exception of some VBRRA representatives to oversee the contract management and other 
aspects including policy and intra-governmental coordination.  If a single contract had not 
been used (refer Section 6.4.3) the role of VBRRA as coordinator for waste management 
may have been more critical. 
 
6.1.4 Legal considerations 
To the authors’ knowledge, there were no legal constraints or implications of the 
establishment of VBRRA on the waste management programme. 
 
 
6.1.5 Environmental effects 
As above, a single coordinating body gave a level of coordination and accountability to the 
management of environmental impacts directly relating to the bushfire waste.  If no central 
body was operational the responsibility for the various environmental issues associated with 
the waste may have fallen between several organisations (see Section 6.1.3).  Waste 
management stakeholders were able to coordinate their regulatory requirements through this 
body without taking overall responsibility for all the waste. 
 
VBRRA itself had little or no experience in waste and environmental management issues.  As 
a coordinating body it was VBRRA’s role to seek appropriate expertise on waste 
management and ensure the waste management approach was in-line with long-term waste 
management strategies and immediate recovery needs.  However, it appears that the waste 
management approach taken by VBRRA was determined entirely independently of the 
existing waste system with no connection to future solid waste management planning.  
Factors such as preservation of landfill space, establishment of new recycling facilities etc. 
were not considered.   
 
In addition, project implementation was handed over to Grocon.  Although the programme 
was largely successful, as a building contractor, Grocon did not necessarily have the 
expertise to fully understand current solid waste management issues.  Neither Grocon, nor 
VBRRA, had a vested interest in considering the longer term impacts of the waste 
management operation on future solid waste management operations. 
 
 
6.1.6 Economic effects 
As for the environmental effects, VBRRA was able to coordinate and disseminate all the 
funding for the waste management operations.  If many organisations (say individual councils 
and/or private contractors) had been dealing with the waste, the funds may not have been 
used as effectively and there would have been potential for overlap of activities. 
 
 
6.1.7 Social effects 
VBRRA was also a focal point for the community.  The establishment of a central authority 
gave the community a first port of call with any issues they had regarding waste 
management.  Before the establishment of VBRRA, the EPA and local Councils were 
receiving calls from the community regarding debris management and hazardous substance 
handling.  However, it is interesting to note that once the contract was awarded the focal 
point actually became Grocon, not VBRRA.  During interviews with community members it 
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was rare for someone to mention VBRRA or the government in respect of the clean-up 
operation.  
 
 
6.1.8 Summary 
Overall the timely establishment of VBRRA played a positive role in the waste management 
process.  VBRRA initially took responsibility for the waste management programme, 
established the registration system, facilitated initial environmental assessments.  VBRRA 
then contracted Grocon to manage the implementation of the clean-up operations and 
delegated much of the ongoing state authority and private waste management operator 
coordination to them.   In this case, Grocon was able to liaise effectively and complete the 
clean-up operations effectively.  This allowed VBRRA resources to be focussed elsewhere.  
Table 6-1 summarises the strengths and weaknesses of the establishment of VBRRA.   
 
Table 6-1 VBBRA establishment assessment summary  
 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Or
ga
nis
ati
on
al 
• Initial focal point for community and 
stakeholders in waste and 
environmental issues. 
• VBRRA took accountability for 
management of the bushfire waste. 
 
 
Le
ga
l N/A N/A 
En
vir
on
me
nta
l • VBRRA managed and took accountability for potential 
environmental hazards associated 
with the waste. 
 
• No prior experience in waste and 
environmental management. 
• No vested interest or accountability in 
long term waste management issues. 
Ec
on
om
ic 
• VBRRA managed and coordinated 
funding of clean-up works efficiently. 
 
So
cia
l • VBRRA (and subsequently Grocon) was a focal point for community on 
waste management concerns. 
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6.2 Decision 2: Single waste classification and management 
procedures 
6.2.1 Decision-making process 
As Ms. Jenny Macklin noted (refer Section 5.2.1) the Commonwealth and State governments 
wanted to remove hazardous materials, minimise public health hazard and to get 
communities back on their feet as quickly as possible.  The decision to classify all debris as a 
single waste classification was clearly designed to meet this goal.   
 
According to EPA, a greater weighting in the informal risk assessment was given to health & 
safety concerns over environmental aspects of waste handling and disposal.  However, by 
classifying all waste as C&D waste with other contaminants (including Class B asbestos) 
without extensive testing and designing all handling and disposal procedures accordingly, an 
elevated (compared to ‘peace-time’ standards) acceptance of risk of exposure to these 
hazards was consequently accepted. 
 
 
6.2.2 Delays 
Coroner investigations, and the time taken to decide that the government would fund the 
clean-up, meant EPA and DHS had approximately four weeks to establish processes for 
waste handling, transportation and disposal.  However, in another event, a four week delay in 
establishing waste management procedures may not be acceptable, especially if significant 
acute hazards existed in the waste matrix and threatened residents.   
 
EPA advised that the emergency environmental legislation used, Section 30A, could be 
activated within 24 hours.  Decision-making authority is clearly delegated and approval 
processes are streamlined.  However, the assessments, decision-making and procedural 
development required to prepare the Section 30A are likely to take more time.  Information 
availability and decision-making guidance would aid in the stream-lining of these emergency 
environmental approvals. 
 
The Dangerous Goods Order, outlining asbestos handling procedures, was issued within 
nine days of Black Saturday.  This was particularly important to minimise public health 
threats for those in contact with the fire debris.  The sooner a protection measure such as 
this can be put in force, the lower the risks to the public.  As for the emergency 
environmental legislation above, the decision-making process is the critical path and a 
strategy (developed pre-disaster) on how to make these decisions quickly would make this 
process more efficient. 
 
In terms of programme implementation the single waste classification allowed all waste to be 
handled quickly while also minimising risk to worker safety.  Without the single waste 
classification, all waste would have had to be handled under current ‘peace time’ regulations, 
including time consuming testing and management of hazardous substances including 
asbestos.  In particular, if Class A (friable) asbestos was detected, management 
requirements would include: 
• Slow and cumbersome demolition techniques including sealing the site to make it 
airtight. 
• Stringent health and safety procedures including use of certified personnel (which 
there was an identified shortage of). 
• Double wrapping of waste in plastic (health and safety issues and limited material 
availability). 
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• Disposal at a prescribed industrial waste landfill – which is costly and there is 
insufficient landfill airspace available. 
 
 
6.2.3 Organisational aspects 
The majority of the professionals interviewed agreed that collaboration between all the 
governmental agencies and private organisations involved in the demolition and debris 
removal works was effective.  However, it should be noted that there was no pre-planning to 
establish this cross-department collaboration.  To expedite the process in any future event 
and to ensure the correct people with decision-making authority are involved in this 
collaboration a cross-agency collaboration plan would be beneficial. 
 
 
6.2.4 Legal considerations 
Within the scope of this research, it appears that the Victorian legislation and regulatory 
control of environmental and health and safety processes is simple and clear and was able to 
be manipulated effectively to suit the single waste classification approach used.  Emergency 
provisions to facilitate the fast response were straight forward to activate and implement and 
the provisions provided enough latitude and at the same time control to allow for a safe and 
expedient debris management process.  However, as described in Section 6.2.1, a clear 
procedure for post-disaster assessments and guidance for decision-making under these 
emergency laws would help to guide decision-makers.  To validate and justify the use of 
these emergency legal provisions the acceptable risks need to be understood relative to 
varying disaster impacts.  The procedure for this could be prepared pre-disaster. 
 
While Section 30A and Section 55 are emergency provisions, they were not necessarily 
designed for community wide events.  According to Wheelan (EPA), the Section 30A 
provision has not been used on this scale before but Wheelan felt it was the “perfect tool”.  
However, neither of these emergency law provisions appears to have a prosecution and/or 
liability exclusion clause in the event of unforeseen consequences of the emergency action.  
This lack of protection does not support the decision-maker. 
 
 
6.2.5 Environmental effects 
The single waste classification had both positive and negative effects on the environment.  
The main impact of the waste classification was the speed with which it allowed the debris to 
be managed.  The speed of the process reduced the potential for contaminants to wash into 
waterways and/or leach into the ground. 
 
Landfill disposal 
Without thorough testing / analysis of the waste matrix, there is less certainty over the 
environmental outcomes of disposal at landfill.  A single waste classification means that any 
significant volumes of harmful substances may go undetected and may not be disposed of 
appropriately.  However, it is likely that any such substances would have been identified as a 
potential hazard (through odour and appearance) prior to disposal. 
 
Recycling 
There was no provision for recycling / reuse of the debris material in the contract or through 
the waste classification process.  Due to the small volume of debris and charred nature of the 
materials this is not surprising.  Within a few weeks, Grocon had established a recycling 
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programme within the demolition works for two reasons: to meet one of their core business 
objectives (environment); and secondly to reduce costs (see Section 6.2.6). 
 
In a larger scale event the omission of recycling requirements may have had more significant 
environmental and economic impacts, particularly where landfill airspace is limited and 
resource availability for rebuilding is limited.  The waste management programme following 
the 2000 Cerro Grande Wildfire in New Mexico achieved a 95% reuse, recycling rate 
(USEPA, 2008), demonstrating that fire waste is reusable and recyclable.  
 
 
6.2.6 Economic effects 
Direct Costs 
As a result of the single waste classification (including a low hazard rating on the waste) the 
direct costs of the waste management process were reduced by lowering disposal costs and 
by eliminating the requirement for site testing. 
 
No provision or requirement for recycling (and associated reduced disposal costs and 
potential for revenue generation) was considered in this approach to waste classification.  
However, the classification did not exclude recycling either and Grocon found recycling was 
beneficial to its operation for economic and environmental reasons.  Therefore, in this case, 
the omission of recycling requirements is not considered to have had a significant economic 
impact. 
 
 
Indirect Costs 
The fast debris management process using the single waste classification allowed for 
business regeneration to start quickly, and in turn this would decrease community 
dependence on government / external financial assistance. 
 
 
6.2.7 Social effects 
The stream-lined procedures established, implemented and monitored through the single 
waste classification process allowed for a relatively efficient clean-up process.  Debris 
presence is a constant reminder of the losses of a disaster (Petersen, 2004) so any 
procedure which hastens the removal process will have a positive effect on community 
recovery.   
 
 
Perception 
This straight forward and consistent approach to waste management also has a positive 
effect on public perception of the debris management process.  If repeated testing and 
individual site evaluations were required at every site, the public may develop an elevated 
perception of the risk involved in debris management.  An elevated risk perception may in 
turn slow down the clean-up process as more opposition to debris management practices 
may develop.  It is interesting to note that all community members interviewed were of the 
understanding that no dispensations had been made to peace-time health and safety 
standards to facilitate the clean-up.   
 
 
Speed 
The decision to remove waste as quickly as possible significantly reduced the risk of 
exposure of asbestos and other hazardous substances to the public.  If no stream-lining had 
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been adopted the waste presence in the community would have been prolonged and 
exposure to the community members extended, particularly those residents going back to 
salvage personal belongings without appropriate protective equipment. 
 
 
Health & Safety 
A single waste classification allowed for consistent and straightforward worker protection 
measures to be put in place.  The classification accepted a higher level of risk than would 
perhaps have been assumed in a ‘peace-time’ situation but the risks had been identified and 
management techniques adopted (such as air monitoring, fully wetting all debris, covering 
trucks etc) to minimise risk of exposure to the public and environment.  It should be noted 
that Grocon elected to protect all workers as if Class A asbestos was present.  During the 
March community interview process, health and safety was continually ranked by community 
members as more important than environmental issues.   
 
It is interesting to note that in 2003, County authorities following the Cedar and Pines fires in 
San Diego conducted tests on the ash material that showed there were state-regulated levels 
of hazardous constituents in the ash.  Following those tests a county wide property clearance 
programme was implemented, superseding the previous private property owner managed 
clean-up (County of San Diego, 2005). 
 
The air monitoring carried out during the demolition works supported the decision to handle 
all waste as Class B opposed to Class A asbestos waste.  No measurable quantities of 
asbestos fibres were reported, however, in the absence of comprehensive testing on every 
site, it is impossible to rule out the possibility that Class A asbestos was present.  As far as 
the author is aware, no testing was carried out for other contaminants. 
 
Disposal of asbestos at a municipal waste landfill is not normal practice, so the management 
of the asbestos containing material may become a future hazard if the landfill is not well 
managed and asbestos disposal sites are not well documented. 
 
Without extensive testing (available in ‘peace-time’ situations) to gain a better understanding 
of the level of risk, the decision-makers here were forced to accept higher risks than they 
would have in ‘peace-time’ to meet their objectives.  Whether or not the decision is later 
vindicated, as was the case here, the initial decision still had to be made with limited 
information and assurance. 
 
 
Local Labour 
The requirement for only Class B asbestos certification for waste handlers increased the 
number of local contractors that were able to participate in the clean-up works.  It also 
reduced the training requirements for those who wished to gain certification.  Local labour 
use in the clean-up programme was one of the main issues identified by the affected 
communities (see Section 6.4.7)  
 
6.2.8 Summary 
Overall the single waste classification expedited the speed of the cleanup works with both 
minimal environmental risk and health and safety risk to waste handlers and the public.  The 
legal arrangements that allowed for the waste classification were straightforward to 
implement, however, benefit would be gained from improving procedures on how emergency 
legislation is used and what sort of assessments are carried out in order to validate use of 
these provisions. 
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Table 6-2 summarises the strengths and weaknesses of the single waste classification.   
 
Table 6-2 Bushfire waste classification assessment summary 
 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Or
ga
nis
ati
on
al • Good ‘on the spot’ collaboration between government agencies. 
 
• No pre-determined inter-agency 
collaboration (eg EPA, DHS, Vic Roads) 
for emergency waste management 
issues. 
 
Le
ga
l 
• Existing legislation was simple and 
effective to apply to the single waste 
classification approach. 
• Current legislation was not designed 
with disaster recovery in mind and it is 
unclear whether liability or prosecution 
protection is included. 
• There were no risk assessment 
processes to help decision-makers 
justify use of emergency legislation. 
 
En
vir
on
me
nta
l • Removed contaminants from site quickly. 
• Reduced the potential for 
contaminants to wash into 
waterways or leach into the ground 
(in the event of a slow clean-up). 
 
• Unclear environmental assessment 
processes used to validate single waste 
classification. 
• Uncertainty in environmental outcomes 
of landfill disposal. 
• No provision for waste reduction / 
recycling / reuse. 
 
Ec
on
om
ic 
• Disposal costs were reduced. 
• Testing / monitoring costs were 
reduced. 
• Aided business and general 
community economic recovery by 
expediting clean-up process. 
 
• No provision for waste reduction / 
recycling / reuse. 
 
So
cia
l 
• Expedited recovery (positive 
psychological effects). 
• Removed contaminants from site 
quickly reducing public health 
hazard. 
• Reduced the potential for prolonged 
exposure to air-borne asbestos (in 
the event of a slow clean-up). 
• Lowered the public’s perception of 
the risk (by not testing every site). 
• Ensured a consistent level of worker 
protection 
• Increased the number of local 
labourers qualified to carry out 
works. 
 
• Potential air-borne asbestos not 
contained sufficiently (c.f. ‘peace-time’ 
standards).  
• Potential future asbestos hazard at 
landfill. 
• Higher acceptance of exposure risk to 
workers and community given the 
absence of individual site testing. 
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6.3 Decision 3: Government funding 
6.3.1 Decision-making process 
The decision to fund the demolition and debris removal works on private property was clearly 
driven by the Government’s objectives to clear debris and hazardous materials from bushfire 
affected properties and ‘to help people get started as quickly as we [the State and 
Commonwealth Governments] can’ (The Premier of Victoria, 2009).  The government wanted 
to aid the social recovery while minimising the impact on the environment.  And while not 
explicitly stated, there would also be clear benefits to the economic recovery of the 
community (see Section 6.3.6).  By and large the demolition and debris removal works 
programme appears to have met the state and commonwealth government’s objectives.   
 
As noted by Tim Bamford, VBRRA, it takes extraordinary political courage to let a multi-
million dollar contract in seven days, in particular, a contract with no overall budget and 
unknown scope (in terms of number of properties).  Pre-determining the extent of disaster 
waste management assistance relative to disaster impact would help to reduce the pressure 
on decision-makers at the time of the disaster. 
 
It is important to note that many of the costs incurred by municipalities in clearing disaster 
debris (both on public property and from kerbside collection) is claimable through various 
government funding mechanisms.  Ordinarily this would not include private property 
clearance.  So the major additional funding here was for the clearance on private properties. 
 
Debris management following previous fires in the US have been funded by a range of 
organisations including insurance, the Federal and Emergency Management Agency and the 
Local Government (USEPA, 2008), (County of San Diego, 2005), (State of California, 1997). 
 
 
6.3.2 Delays 
The decision for the government to pay for demolition and debris removal was not made (or 
at least not publically announced) until 20 days after Black Saturday.  The delay was a direct 
result of lack of institutional preparedness for such a large scale event.  The decision 
required political and financial support which took time to establish.  In the future the 
government (at local, state and commonwealth levels) needs to pre-position itself to respond 
quickly with an array of pre-determined response strategies (in terms of levels of funding and 
coordination) which can be implemented for varying degrees of disaster impact. 
 
If no funding had been provided an additional delay in the demolition would probably have 
arisen from the time taken for insurance companies, charitable donations and possibly 
government grants to be assessed and awarded before individual property owners could 
facilitate clean-up works.   These delays would have potentially exacerbated any negative 
environmental, social and economic impacts - such as delaying removal of potentially 
hazardous materials which pose a risk to environmental and public safety and slowing local 
business recuperation etc.  Community members surveyed agreed that if funding had not 
been provided the recovery would have been significantly delayed. 
 
 
6.3.3 Organisational aspects 
Provision of blanket funding allowed waste management activities to be provided and 
prioritised with other recovery activities.  If individual property owners, insurance companies, 
local government etc had been required to source their own funding, financial resources may 
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have been allocated inappropriately and ineffectively from the perspective of an overall 
community recovery (refer Section 6.3.6).  Many people may not have had access to any 
assistance or resources at all.  Available waste management resources (plant, trucks, 
personnel) would also have been used less effectively and undoubtedly given rise to 
inexperienced opportunists participating in the clean-up.   
 
The blanket funding reduced the potential for inaction by residents slow to carry out their own 
clean-up.  A Councillor from Mitchell Shire commented that it eliminated the potential for 
Council to have to step into an enforcement role if residents failed to clean-up their 
properties.  Enforcement actions have the potential to alienate the already stressed 
community. 
 
 
6.3.4 Legal considerations 
At this stage it is unclear whether or not provision of funding has any legal implications in 
Victoria.  In the US there is currently some debate over whether or not the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has any liability for adverse effects of emergency 
activities that it has funded (Luther, 2008). 
 
 
6.3.5 Environmental effects 
While not stated explicitly as a decision driver for the government funding, there was 
undoubtedly a benefit to protection of the natural environment.  Timely and comprehensive 
funding allowed for a process to be established to minimise the impact of the bushfire waste 
on the environment.  If funding/ assistance had not been provided to property owners, then 
there may well have been increased incidences of illegal dumping and/or improper waste 
handling, particularly in this rural setting with a ‘dump in the ditch’ mentality.  Fences (not 
included in the Grocon contract), in particular were cited by residents as a difficult item to 
handle and dispose of due to their bulky nature.  Some landfills do not accept this type of 
bulky waste. 
 
However, it must be noted that the decision to fund the process was merely a vehicle to allow 
appropriate environmental protection.  For funding to be ‘environmentally’ effective and 
appropriate, an appropriate delivery or implementation mechanism must be employed.   
 
 
Scope 
The limitation in government funding is the inevitable limitation in scope.  While the waste 
management under the contract scope was carried out under controlled and well monitored 
circumstances, no systems were put in place to cope with works outside the contract scope.  
Systems needed include disposal facilities, collection services, health and safety advice, etc.  
Under a government funded approach communities were not educated on how best to 
manage their own wastes outside the scope of the funding.  It is likely that the responsibility 
for these waste management systems would lie with the Municipality under the Victorian 
emergency management arrangements.  However, regardless of responsibility, the 
appropriate systems have not been put in place in this response. 
 
The Shire of Yarra Ranges were anticipating that inappropriate management outside the 
contract scope would become a problem.  The Shire were advocating for VBRRA to extend 
the scope.  Potential problems include illegal dumping and CCA contamination from fence 
posts.  In general, however, the amount of CCA given the large area affected would have 
minimal environmental impacts. 
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6.3.6 Economic effects 
Another, implicitly stated objective (which results from fast community recovery) was to 
facilitate economic recovery in the area.  This includes: 
• business regeneration 
• economic stimulus through rebuilding 
• reduction of dependence on government assistance  
 
If no government or centralised funding was provided and insurance or private funding was 
needed for debris removal works it is likely the clean-up would have been delayed while 
insurance claims were processed and individual contractors were engaged.   
 
Residents of tourism centred economies like Marysville in particular, recognised that debris 
removal was an essential part of recovery and rebuild both personally and for the wider 
community.  However, following the Bushfires, residents found that economic regeneration 
was limited by other recovery issues such as an unclear / poor recovery planning, lack of 
economic stimulus assistance for the area, and individual business reluctance to invest in the 
area. 
 
 
Funding precedence 
While overall the community response to funding provision was very positive, there is a 
possibility that the state and federal government has now set a precedent for future events. 
The majority of community members surveyed said that they expected to receive the same 
assistance in a similar or bigger size disaster.  Commonwealth, state and local government 
now need to consider the precedent that has been set by providing the demolition and debris 
removal assistance and consider how they want their communities to prepare for future 
disaster events. 
 
For residents who had already cleaned up their properties (through private funding or 
insurance) they faced a potentially difficult task of claiming their money back from the 
VBRRA.  This provides a disincentive for property owners in the future who are proactive and 
help themselves as they find that they face an uphill battle in seeking compensation; 
whereas those that waited until the government stepped in have a far smoother road.  
Generally, it is understood that the reimbursement process here was relatively 
straightforward. 
 
As part of the ‘funding precedence’ the role of insurance needs to be addressed.  Many 
residents were not insured or were under insured (i.e. many insurance policies did not 
routinely include for debris removal works) and consequently a lengthy delay in the 
demolition and debris management process would have undoubtedly occurred if the state 
and commonwealth governments had not stepped in.  However, some who were insured felt 
that they were due compensation from the insurance companies for work the government 
had completed essentially on the insurance companies’ behalf.  In some cases insurance 
companies did compensate for this but it depended on the policy type, wording and 
insurance company.  If there is an expectation that the government will provide assistance 
for demolition and debris works, the level of cover desired and provided may reduce and/or 
there may be increased variability in the insurance coverage of property owners. 
 
Amongst those surveyed, opinion was divided as to whether people without insurance should 
have received assistance of any kind.  While many recognised the benefit of global 
assistance for overall community recovery, others felt that government assistance should be 
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evenly distributed between insured and non-insured people.  The blanket funding of the 
debris management programme here, met these two community identified objectives.  
 
Governments at local, state and commonwealth levels need to consider if there is a trigger 
level or levels, in terms of disaster impact, for provision of global funding assistance for 
demolition and debris removal.  Because of the potential community, environmental and 
public health impact of disaster debris, there are immense benefits from centralised 
management of the debris.  But government needs to consider what message of 
preparedness it would like to send to its people: does it intend to always provide assistance?  
And if so how much?  Or do they want to empower communities to facilitate their own 
demolition and debris management works.  This message needs to be consistent, well 
publicised and in-line with insurance company policies. 
 
6.3.7 Social effects 
Public health and safety 
One of the two main objectives for providing government funding was to reduce the public 
health risk posed by the presence of the debris.  The provision of funding certainly allowed 
for this process to be facilitated but as stated above – the provision of funding only facilitated 
this process and did not necessarily ensure a successful programme.   
 
However, for debris management works carried out outside the scope of the government 
funded clean-up, there was limited education or support given on health and safety issues. 
 
 
Community 
The demolition and debris removal programme was the first tangible / visible assistance to 
the community from the government.  The funding signalled to the community that the 
government was willing to help it rebuild quickly.   
 
The funding provision also provided the first necessary step to allow for rebuilding to 
commence.  Bortoletto (Grocon) described the debris clearance as ‘a huge hurdle’ in the 
recovery process and observed immense gratitude in having the hurdle removed.  
Community members surveyed described the ‘relief’ felt after having the debris removed.  
Many of them felt the job was just too big for them to deal with alone.  One respondent 
described the transformation of Marysville as “gone from rubbish heaps to a new housing 
development” and another as a “a new beginning”.  One business owner in Marysville noted 
that they would not have stayed in the area if the government had not paid for and facilitated 
debris removal. 
 
All community members surveyed agreed that the government made the right decision to 
fund debris removal and many called it the best initiative the government had.   
 
 
Scope 
As discussed in the environmental effects section above if the contract scope is limited there 
will be activities that need to be carried out or facilitated by residents.  The limited scope was 
seen by some surveyed as a failure of the state and commonwealth government to assist 
fully.  In particular, community members with property damage outside the scope of the 
debris contract (fencing, trees etc) felt that they had been neglected by the government.  
However, it must be acknowledged that any disaster assistance funding is limited.  
Authorities needed to communicate the justification for their decisions and provide guidance 
on how those who are not included in the assistance scheme can help themselves. 
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Assistance dependence 
Residents may gain a dependence on external assistance through this sort of government 
assistance.  Direct government assistance may lower both their willingness to help 
themselves during the recovery from this disaster and lower their preparedness for any future 
events.  However, if communities understand the scope of the assistance and the expected 
extent of their role in the recovery, from the beginning, this sort of dependence could be 
avoided. 
 
 
6.3.8 Summary 
Overall, government funding of private property demolition and debris removal was very 
successful.  The initiative had the desired effect of facilitating a timely and well coordinated 
clean-up operation.  The two major disadvantages of the government funding were: the 
potential for setting a funding precedence for future disasters; and the subsequent non-
provision of assistance (in financial, practical or educational terms) of those carrying out 
clean-up operations which were outside the scope of the government funding. 
 
Table 6-3 summarises the strengths and weaknesses of government funding of the private 
demolition and debris removal works.   
 
Table 6-3 Bushfire government funding assessment summary 
 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Or
ga
nis
ati
on
al 
• Allowed for prioritisation of financial 
resources with other recovery 
activities to aid overall community 
recovery. 
• Reduced the potential for Council to 
have to act in an enforcement role 
for un-cleared properties. 
 
 
Le
ga
l 
 • Possible (unsubstantiated in Victoria) 
state and commonwealth government 
liability for potential adverse effects 
resulting from state / commonwealth 
funded works. 
 
En
vir
on
me
nta
l • Expedited removal of potential environmental contaminants. 
• Potentially reduced incidents of 
illegal dumping / improper waste 
handling. 
 
• No provisions or guidance for works 
carried out outside the scope of the 
government works – which led to 
improper waste disposal. 
 
Ec
on
om
ic 
• Expedited economic recovery 
(through business regeneration and 
reduce welfare dependence time). 
• Eliminated insurance or private 
funding lag. 
• No existing guidelines on provision of 
funding for disaster waste management 
on private property. 
• Potentially reduced financial 
preparedness for future disasters. 
• Potentially impacted on future insurance 
coverage (both in terms of policies 
offered and policies taken out). 
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So
cia
l 
• Allowed expeditious removal of 
potential public health hazards. 
• First tangible piece of government 
assistance. 
• Aided and in some cases 
encouraged community rebuilding. 
• Removed a psychological barrier to 
recovery. 
• Ineligible residents frustrated by non-
inclusion in government funded clean-
up.   
• Little or no education or support on 
health and safety issues for those 
carrying out works outside the 
government funded clean-up. 
• Reduction of community preparedness 
and willingness to help themselves for 
future disasters. 
 
 
6.4 Decision 4: Single Contract 
There are many variations for execution of demolition and debris removal services including:  
• Single contract for all demolition and debris removal works 
• Letting multiple contracts for combined demolition and debris removal works (perhaps 
each under a separate Shire) 
• Separating demolition and debris removal works and contracting each component to 
separate contractors 
• Requiring residents to facilitate demolition and debris removal works independently 
and applying for reimbursement  
• Requiring residents to facilitate demolition and letting a contract service for kerbside 
debris collection and disposal 
 
In this report a single contract refers to a contract let to one contractor to carry out both the 
demolition and debris removal works with no participation from residents.   
 
 
6.4.1 Decision-making process 
To date no contact has been made with state or federal government officials responsible for 
design of the single contract.  However, in general, the selection of the mode of works 
execution would largely depend on the spread of debris, extent of destruction and degree of 
hazard in the waste.  Given the low volumes of waste, potential for hazardous materials and 
the large percentage of houses requiring complete demolition it is understandable that a 
single contract was established.   
 
 
6.4.2 Delays 
There were two delays associated with the government’s decision to let a single contract – a 
two week delay prior to the decision and a 1 week delay following the decision.  With pre-
event planning both delays could have been reduced if not avoided. 
 
The two week delay prior to this decision resulted from the slow decision to fund the 
demolition and debris removal works (refer Section 6.3.2).  
 
The one week delay following the decision resulted from the time taken to call for and assess 
tenders; and agree on the Contract rates and conditions etc.  This delay could be reduced if 
pre-arranged contracts were in place – including agreed rates and terms of conditions.  
Obviously some Contract details such as scope cannot be established until after the event.    
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In total it took 20 days for the Victorian Government to award the debris management 
contract to Grocon.  In comparison it took 6 weeks to establish a waste management 
contract for both the Oakland firestorm (State of California, 1997) and the 2003 Cedar and 
Pines Fires, San Diego (USEPA, 2008). 
 
It is important to note, however, that the delays for the contract set-up were in parallel with 
other activities.  Firstly, the delay allowed the EPA / DHS to establish waste handling 
procedures prior to the contract commencing.  Secondly, some areas were inaccessible for 
up to eight weeks due to Coroner investigations.  Overwhelmingly the community members 
surveyed were very happy with the timing of the clean-up works.  
 
The bushfires provided an interesting and perhaps less urgent (when compared to other 
natural disaster types) waste management problem.  The high level of physical destruction, 
number of displaced people and the absence of need to quickly clear debris for health and 
safety reasons or emergency access meant immediate waste management action was not 
critical.  This fact, coupled with the delays from the Coroner and EPA/DHS process meant 
the net effect of the delays on awarding a single contract was marginal.  
 
Despite the initial delays associated with letting the contract, the overall effect of a single 
contract on timing of the waste removal and demolition works was positive.  The governing 
authorities were able to set a deadline for completion of demolition works and to monitor 
completion closely.  If property owners had been required to facilitate their own clean-up, it 
would be extremely difficult to enforce debris removal programmes.  Delays in waste removal 
could pose a public health and safety risk as well as an environmental risk.  And this would 
also have a follow-on effect on the recovery programme. 
 
 
6.4.3 Organisational aspects 
Communication 
The chains of communication are centralised through a single point (the main Contractor) 
and disseminated vertically through sub-contractors.  Regulatory and operational procedures 
are easily transmitted through these lines. 
 
The emphasis on local labour use (often independent or small contracting companies) 
undoubtedly increased the number of sub-contracts that Grocon had to manage.  The larger 
the number of organisations, the more difficult it is for communication.  There were 
inconsistent reports on the performance of Grocon’s contractors and this is largely attributed 
to individual sub-contractors and the inconsistencies between them.  There are significant 
benefits from the use of local labour (refer Section 6.4.7) and with good organisational 
systems communication and consistency between organisations can be monitored and 
managed by the Managing Contractor.   
 
Resourcing 
A single contractor can more efficiently coordinate and utilise resources (in this case 
primarily personnel, trucks and some demolition equipment).  Of course, if the disaster is too 
big then a single contractor may not be able to manage the entire operation.  In this case a 
single contract for demolition and debris removal worked well. 
 
In response to a relatively small earthquake event in Te Anau NZ, 2003, the Earthquake 
Commission (EQC) (which provides statutory funding for natural disaster recovery) trialled a 
single contract to manage all recovery building works.  While this was a small event, and 
limited conclusions can be drawn, this approach meant that individual property owners did 
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not have to compete for limited resources and services and thus, was considered an overall 
success (Rotimi et al., 2006). 
 
 
State vs local approach 
The private property demolition and waste management process was handled almost entirely 
independently of the Shires or local authorities (regulated and implemented at State level, 
through the State appointed recovery authority, VBRRA).  Initially some Shires were 
approached to determine if they had spare capacity in their landfills to accept the fire debris, 
however, it was decided that capacity was not available in any local landfills.  From that point 
forward there appeared to be no coordination between the government contractor (Grocon) 
and the activities of the Shire.  Largely the municipal waste management system remained 
unchanged and the government funded contract formed a separate and almost completely 
independent waste management tier. 
 
This segregated approach had some advantages.  Local authorities’ resources were 
stretched during a disaster response, so removing the burden of demolition and debris 
removal works was an immense relief.  Municipalities were able to continue their standard 
municipal waste collection services without disruption, thus eliminating a potential public 
health risk from municipal waste.  A single approach to waste management was possible 
across all districts as opposed to varying standards for different authorities.  These all 
undoubtedly resulted in time and cost savings. 
 
The disadvantage of a segregated approach is that there is little communication flow 
between the groups which may result in some double up of activities and ineffective resource 
sharing (for example Murrindindi Shire’s reluctance to offer it’s landfill site).  This lack of 
communication may also lead to a lack of integration of the disaster waste management 
programme into the existing waste management system.  For example, long term waste 
strategies in a community may prioritise certain landfill sites over others or may specify the 
development of certain recycling facilities which could be expedited through the clean-up 
process. 
 
 
Public vs private 
The demolition and debris removal programme was open to all public and private buildings.  
The lack of distinction between building ownership is considered by the author to be a very 
positive aspect of the funding in this case.  The economy of scale, the streamlining of 
environmental processes and resources achieved through the single private debris 
management contract would have been lost if there had been a distinction made between 
building ownership.   
 
Some local authorities, however, elected to manage their own demolition and debris 
management of public buildings in order to minimise disruption of private clean-up works 
under the Grocon programme.  While these public works were monitored, this additional 
layer in the debris management system has the potential to add several possible burdens to 
the recovery programme: 
• Additional QA for debris handling, disposal and associated certification required. 
• Additional sharing, sourcing and coordination of resources. 
• Loss of economy of scale both in terms of costs and debris management options (e.g. 
resource recovery is more feasible in large quantities). 
• Community disaffection over government prioritising public over private works. 
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Independent contractors 
Some independent operators (not associated with the Grocon works) also participated in 
debris removal operations – through insurance companies, private works or as opportunists 
trying to capitalise on people’s misfortune and vulnerability by providing unregulated disposal 
services.  Landfill operators tried to discourage this by requiring the independent contractors 
to develop and demonstrate that they had suitable handling and transportation measures in 
place prior to waste acceptance. 
 
 
6.4.4 Legal considerations 
Right of entry 
A single contract allowed for a stream-lined process of gaining authorised entry onto 
properties to carry out the clean-up works.  To the author’s knowledge, all works have been 
carried out with the owner’s permission through the VBRRA registration process (Section 
5.2.4).  At the time of writing the author had only heard of one property which elected not to 
register under the Grocon programme.  It is unknown what will happen to this property (or 
others like it) if they are not cleared by (or with the consent of) the owners.  It is understood 
that there are provisions in Victorian law to act to remove acute and/or chronic hazards 
without owners’ consent, if required.   
 
 
Waste ownership 
The single contract also allowed stream-lining and appropriate handling of waste ownership 
issues.  After the property owners had salvaged their belongings residents were required to 
sign an agreement that the Contractor (Grocon) assumed ownership and responsibility for 
the debris.  Ownership included the rights to any proceeds from the sale of recyclable 
material and the responsibility of appropriate disposal of the debris.  However, it should be 
noted that Grocon elected to reinvest the recycling proceeds back into VBRRA and therefore 
the affected communities. 
 
 
6.4.5 Environmental effects 
Monitoring 
A single contract allowed regulatory authorities (in particular EPA and DHS/WorkCover) to 
closely monitor the waste handling, transportation and disposal of the waste.  Determination 
of procedures and processes for waste handling could be quickly agreed upon in 
collaboration with the Contractor.  If multiple contractors had been used, agreement on 
stream-lining, certification and monitoring of processes would likely have been more 
cumbersome and the environmental outcomes less certain. 
 
 
Recycling 
If residents (or persons engaged by private property owners) were involved in the demolition 
and/or debris disposal process, good recycling rates (in terms of quantity of recyclable and 
profit from their sales) would potentially be harder to achieve.  This would result in more 
landfill airspace being utilised and lower material recovery (also see economic effects below).  
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6.4.6 Economic effects 
Economy of scale 
If it is well managed, as was the case here, a single contract has the potential to benefit from 
economies of scale.  Grocon secured bulk savings for material and service supply, contract 
services, recycling, disposal costs etc2.  There is of course a potential for a single contractor 
to monopolise the situation, however, if the correct contract controls are put in place then the 
economy of scale effects will likely prevail. 
 
If residents were required to arrange their own demolition and debris management for cost 
reimbursement from government then the economy of scale benefits would be lost. 
 
 
Profiteering 
Price gouging and profiteering in disaster recovery is common (Jackson, 2008) (Pelling et al., 
2002).  The recovery from the Bushfires was no exception.  Opportunists arose in many 
forms, including: 
• Private Contractors trading on Grocon’s name – offering clean-up services for cash 
• Landfills charging high disposal rates 
• Locals selling water to Grocon for clean-up works 
 
Having a single contract enabled profiteering to be monitored and kept to a minimum.  
Grocon was also able to demand the lowest and/or high volume prices from service 
providers for anything from accommodation to landfill disposal costs.  Grocon also 
generously elected to re-invest the profits or processed materials such as mulch from the 
recycling back into the community to aid in the recovery process. 
 
 
6.4.7 Social effects 
It is important to note here that the author is unaware of any formal community level 
consultation related to the single contract award prior to or during the clean-up operations. 
 
Prioritisation  
A single contract allowed demolition and debris removal works to be prioritised within the 
communities.  Grocon and VBRRA advised that they prioritised schools, community buildings 
and petrol stations where they could.  This ability to prioritise, if well managed and 
coordinated with local leaders, enables primary industries, services and community facilities 
to begin the rebuilding process quickly to kick-start the community and economic recovery in 
a region.  However, there does not appear to have been any community wide input sought 
on appropriate works prioritisation. 
 
 
Community acceptance 
A single contract, if well communicated, is potentially less confusing for residents.  Bortoletto 
(Grocon) noted that early community misconceptions (including cost, timing, local labour use, 
personal belonging salvation etc) about the demolition and debris removal works were 
rectified through open communication.  Grocon attended multiple community meetings and 
engaged community officers to explain the process.  Complaints (only 15-20 complaints in 
over 3000 project sites) were also able to be managed and monitored centrally through a 
complaints register.   
                                               
2 Note this that economies of scale and supply discounts are limited by the competition in the market.  
The ability to negotiate landfill disposal rates at New Zealand landfills for example would be severely 
limited due to the likely lack of alternative disposal sites. 
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Community based research in March 2010 indicated that the majority of residents were 
unaware who funded Grocon as Grocon essentially became “the focal contact point for the 
government” (Bortoletto) in terms of clean-up.  There was considerable speculation within the 
communities as to the legitimacy of the award of the clean-up Contract to Grocon. 
 
 
Private and Public Health & Safety 
The potential for hazardous materials in the waste matrix meant that resident participation in 
the clean-up was not desirable.  A single contract eliminated the need for residents to 
participate in the clean-up thus reducing the public health risk.  Based on the March 2010 
community interviews those that carried out their own clean up or engaged a contractor to do 
so (for works outside the Grocon contract scope) did not use any health and safety 
precautions.  If no single contract had been employed then it is likely that health and safety 
over the community may have been compromised.  Health and safety issues for those 
carrying out their own clean-up needed to be more widely publicised (see Section 6.3.7). 
 
The single contract also allowed the health and safety issues that arose on the Black Spur to 
be quickly identified and addressed.  If individual haulers or contractors only had been 
operating, incidents across a number of organisations may not have been noticed.  The drive 
and focus to mitigate the health and safety risk (ie construction of a better located disposal 
site) might also not have materialised. 
 
Local labour 
There are some potential drawbacks to single contract use in a disaster waste management 
situation.  As was the case here, a contract of this size would often have to be outsourced to 
a large company from outside the immediate area.  The author is aware of at least one 
proposal from a local contractor to manage debris from some of the affected areas.  The 
proposal included for all labour to be sourced locally and for all recycling to be carried out 
locally.  Despite backing from local parliamentary members, the proposal was not accepted.   
 
Despite Grocon contracting approximately 50% of its workforce from local communities, 
there was a feeling within some communities that:  
1. The economic benefits from the clean-up activities were not being kept in the 
community; 
2. Control of the clean-up and overall recovery had been taken away from them (some 
attributed this feeling of helplessness to longer term mental health issues) 
3. Jobs were being taken away from those affected (many had lost their jobs / 
businesses as well as their homes).   
 
The reaction of communities to this use of non-local labour varied across the affected 
communities.  Those communities with low employment and independent lifestyles appeared 
to be more eager to be involved in the waste clearance activities.  Communities with a 
tourism based economy or primary producers, were not so interested in being involved in the 
clean-up.  Farmers were busy doing their own recovery works and those involved in the 
tourist centres, such as Marysville, were not generally skilled and/or willing to work in 
demolition or waste management. 
 
There were also some barriers to inclusion of locals in the labour.  Many were not certified or 
appropriately qualified; many did not have the appropriate equipment; and others were 
simply not ready to participate when the clean-up started.  Some believe that Grocon was 
under time pressure (from VBRRA and the community) to finish and were not willing to 
accept the delays associated with increasing local labour participation. 
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There is widespread acceptance that communities must be involved in the recovery process 
to mitigate potential mental health issues, and that communities must feel empowered during 
the recovery process (Gordon, 2009).  The State Emergency Recovery Plan acknowledges 
that communities recover best when they are supported to manage their own recovery 
(Emergency Management in Victoria, 2005).  The Victorian Government Department of 
Human Services (DHS) also recognised in their psychosocial recovery framework the impact 
of social determinants on mental health – such as poverty, isolation and unemployment 
(DHS, 2009).  Thus, the impact of not including the communities at all in the clean-up 
process, in the decision-making or during the physical works, must have had some level of 
impact on some community members.  Exactly how much impact is not clear.  Conversely it 
could be argued that the centralisation of the debris removal process allowed those affected 
to focus on other recovery efforts instead of clean-up.  Either way, community consultation 
and involvement in the recovery needs to be considered for all aspects of the recovery.   
 
 
6.4.8 Other 
Contractor business impact 
Grocon believes that their involvement in the debris clean-up had multiple non-tangible 
benefits, including a positive impact on their public reputation or brand; personal satisfaction 
for workers; and company togetherness through the development of a culture to “sacrifice for 
the common good”.  Some employees were voluntarily working up to 15 hours a day (with 
pay). 
 
Sacrifices were made from other projects to assist in the effort which created a sense of 
togetherness across the company.  On one existing Grocon project site every worker agreed 
to work an extra hour a day to cover the staff who were assisting in the bushfire clean-up.  
Payroll, IT and HR departments were also strained but they did what was necessary to get 
the job done. 
 
Grocon’s involvement has also led to further work following the bushfires.  The state 
government has recognised the trust Grocon has established within the community and has 
brought them into the rebuilding process as well as a building advisory service.  
 
 
Contract type 
In addition to the organisation of the contract, the details of contract (cost reimbursement, 
lump sum, incentives etc) play a role in the success of the demolition and waste 
management process.  This contract was carried out using a cost reimbursement contract 
(contractor costs plus an overhead fee which excluded profit margin), as provided for in 
Grocon’s tender. 
 
In this case, the cost reimbursement contract worked well.  Grocon was a conscientious 
contractor and endeavoured to minimise costs as much as possible.  Contracts of this kind 
generally require close monitoring to ensure the contractor remains inside the scope of the 
works.  If a contractor who was more focussed on profiteering from the disaster had been let 
the contract, then there would have been potential for cost overruns and time delays (as 
there is no incentive to finish quickly) – particularly as it appears there was no budget cap for 
the operation. 
 
In the US, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) allows only three types of 
contracts: 
• Lump sum (for work within a clearly defined scope) 
• Unit price (cost on an item by item basis) 
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• Cost plus fixed fee (either lump sum or unit price contract with fixed contractor fee) 
 
Typically, according to FEMA, the initial response phase for any disaster is paid for on a time 
and cost basis – before a detailed assessment of the damage can be made.  However, once 
the emergency response is over (say after the first 70-100 hours) and contracts are let for 
some or all of the waste management and demolition works, lump sum, unit price or cost 
plus fixed fees should generally be employed.  FEMA notes that it is important to impose a 
budget cap on the works to deter cost overruns (FEMA, 2008).  
 
Within the contract, overtime payment to employees needs to be considered.  Excessive use 
of overtime may lead to price gouging and unnecessarily increased clean-up costs.  
However, in a situation where speed of debris removal is paramount, these additional costs 
may be justified and readily accepted by the community and authorities.  FEMA considers 
overtime labour costs, consistent with pre-disaster company policies, a legitimate cost and 
therefore eligible for reimbursement (FEMA, 2007). 
 
 
6.4.9 Summary 
Overall all respondents agreed that the single contract, implemented by Grocon, for debris 
removal was a success in this case and community feedback was largely positive, including 
thank you emails, letters and scones!  The single contract allowed for streamlined and 
consistent health and safety and environmental procedures across all affected areas.  
Organisational structures were simple and economy of scale for the physical works was also 
possible.  The major drawback to the single contract was the limited community consultation 
and use of local labour.   
 
Table 6-4 summarises the strengths and weaknesses of using a single contract for 
demolition and debris removal works following the bushfires.   
 
Table 6-4 Bushfire single contract assessment summary 
 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Or
ga
nis
ati
on
al 
• More efficient use of resources. 
• Reduced pressure on local 
government resources. 
• Municipal waste collection continued 
as usual. 
• Clear and simple lines of 
communication established between 
regulatory and governmental 
authorities and the contractor. 
• Streamlining of QA and monitoring 
processes across all affected areas. 
• Minimised individual and/or rogue 
contractors. 
 
• Potentially reduced communication 
between contractor and ‘peace-time’ 
waste managers (which may impact 
resource sharing and effective waste 
management within the existing and 
future waste management 
system).Inconsistency between 
performance of individual 
subcontractors 
 
Le
ga
l • Right of entry requirements were stream-lined. 
• Waste ownership issues were 
stream-lined. 
• There were no procedures identified for 
properties that posed a public health risk 
but did not register for property 
clearance. 
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En
vir
on
me
nta
l • Greater control over environmental outcomes through monitoring and 
process establishment. 
• Greater ability to recycle. 
 
Ec
on
om
ic • Economy of scale (recycling and landfill disposal etc). 
• Minimise profiteering / price gouging. 
 
So
cia
l 
• Greater control over health and 
safety through monitoring and 
process establishment. 
• Allowed for prioritisation of works 
within communities.  
• Simple process for community to 
understand. 
• Easy to monitor community 
acceptance of the waste 
management programme. 
• Greater control on timing of waste 
management works. 
 
• Potential for resentment from local 
community over lack of local labour 
use. 
• Non-inclusion in recovery reinforced 
‘victim’ mentality and allegedly led to 
mental health issues. 
• Does not empower residents to 
participate in own recovery and 
potentially reducing future disaster 
resilience. 
 
 
 
 
6.5 Decision 5: Construction of a new landfill cell 
6.5.1 Decision-making process 
The decision to construct a new landfill cell was largely driven by health and safety concerns 
for workers and the public.  The decision had secondary benefits of reduced transportation 
costs and associated environmental benefits (such as reduced carbon emissions). 
 
In the initial phases of the programme, Grocon investigated disposal options at landfills within 
the fire affected areas in order to reduce transportation time, costs and carbon emissions.  
But it was determined that the local landfills did not have sufficient capacity or were not 
willing to accept bushfire waste.  However, following the health and safety incidents along the 
Black Spur Road (refer Section 5.2.6) there was increased urgency to find an alternative 
disposal site. 
 
The decision to construct the new landfill was largely driven by Grocon and then approved by 
EPA.  EPA facilitated a landfill consenting process which would normally take months, in just 
one week.  In doing this the EPA was essentially accepting an increased environmental risk 
(within its mandate) in order to mitigate a health and safety risk (in another agency’s 
mandate) even though existing approved facilities were available for disposal of the bushfire 
wastes.  According to the EPA, the risk of adverse environmental effects was low at the site.    
 
The essence of the decision is the question of whether or not an additional facility with a 
potentially higher environmental risk, should have been primarily used to reduce an 
occupational health and safety hazard, especially if alternative facilities were available.  It is 
unclear how these potential effects were assessed and traded-off.  Perhaps, the decision is 
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an illustration of the integrated and cross- organisational cooperation that was achieved 
during the bushfire response.  
 
 
6.5.2 Delays 
Effectively the decision to construct a new landfill caused no delays to the overall waste 
management programme.  This was because the programme continued while the landfill was 
conceptualised, approved and constructed.   
 
 
6.5.3 Organisational aspects 
Without adequate prepared landfill area, Murrindindi Shire Council was overwhelmed by the 
prospect of having to construct and operate a landfill in time to receive the bushfire waste 
whilst managing a disaster struck community.   
 
This initial response from the Shire is perhaps indicative of the limited ability of local 
authorities to react in certain crisis situations.  Limited resources to devote to disaster 
preparedness, common in local authorities, could severely hamper a recovery effort.  
Therefore, in terms of debris management, in a widespread / regional event, there are 
significant benefits in operating a regional approach to debris management. 
 
 
6.5.4 Legal considerations 
The new landfill cell was approved under existing legislation and expedited regulatory 
processes.  There is speculative doubt that the constructed landfill would have been certified 
in ‘peace-time’ conditions.  The main legal concern over the landfill is the potential liability 
from unforeseen future adverse environmental effects.   
 
The question is whether this disposal facility should have been constructed under ‘peace-
time’ processes or whether it would have been more suitable to provide for it under an 
emergency provision.  While the end result would remain unchanged, the blurring of activities 
carried out in ‘peace-time’ and those carried out in an emergency response could be 
avoided.  This is particularly true if there is a potential for future liability for any adverse 
effects.  While most parties agree the risk of environmental and public health risk was low, in 
this case, due to the nature of the site and waste, there was undoubtedly elevated risk 
acceptance given the landfill was designed and built so quickly. 
 
Upon completion, the landfill cell was handed back to the Shire for maintenance and 
monitoring as part of their ongoing landfill operations.  Grocon (contractor for construction 
and operation of the cell) was not required to assume the standard liability period of 30 years 
(for any adverse effects on the environment such as ground water contamination).  Given the 
nature of the waste, Murrindindi Shire were happy to accept that responsibility.  The details 
of the legal agreement and handover between Grocon and Murrindindi Shire have not been 
seen, however, if there were any future adverse effects all parties involved would likely be 
investigated, including: 
• Council –owner of the site and landfill operators 
• Grocon – Contractors and their subcontractors 
• EPA – for approving the works 
• State and Commonwealth Government / VBRRA – for funding the works 
• Landfill designer – for designing the works 
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Sita Environmental, the Taylor’s Road landfill owner and operator, advised that ordinarily 12 
months would be required to construct a new landfill cell.  They would not consider it feasible 
in a disaster unless they were provided with total indemnity for any liability for adverse 
environmental effects for the standard 30 year maintenance period. 
 
 
6.5.5 Environmental effects 
Without observing the design, construction, waste placement, covering operation etc., it is 
difficult to accurately assess the potential environmental impacts of this landfill operation.  
Given the inert nature or low putrescibility of the waste (EPA described it as essentially 
construction & demolition waste), the EPA concluded that there was relatively low 
environmental risk and that the level of protection by a single clay liner, in this environment, 
constructed over a two week period was sufficient protection to the surrounding environment 
from bushfire classified waste.   
 
A cursory analysis indicates that: 
• There will probably be little or no landfill gas from the bushfire waste  
• Asbestos will cause little problem as it is essentially benign once it is buried.   
• There may only be small amounts of heavy metals and other hazardous substances 
depending on demolition sites taken to landfill (eg industrial properties). 
 
The specifications of the constructed landfill were well below the accepted normal practice 
for a landfill accepting mixed waste – such as the waste included in the bushfire waste 
classification – and below existing liner specifications at the Murrindindi site.  The Victorian 
Best Practice Guidelines for Landfills (Victoria EPA, 2001) do not explicitly state the minimum 
liner specifications or requirements but state that approval is subject to site specific design.  
 
It is understood that the staff provided by the contractor for operation of the landfill cell had 
previous landfill operation experience.  Inexperienced personnel would have had limited skills 
in identifying and mitigating potential risks specific to landfill operations.   
 
Reduced traffic movements and waste haulage distances led to reduced carbon emissions.  
 
 
6.5.6 Economic effects 
Savings were made to the Contractor (on behalf of the state and commonwealth 
government) in transportation by reducing the waste haulage distances.  Note that, according 
to Grocon, this was a secondary benefit and not a main decision-driver. 
 
Clearly additional costs were incurred in the construction and operation of the landfill.  It is 
unknown whether or not the costs of the landfill construction and operation were considered 
in the justification for the landfill construction. 
 
 
6.5.7 Social effects 
Health & Safety 
The construction of the landfill reduced truck movements through Melbourne and along the 
Black Spur Road.  The health and safety risk to truck drivers and other road users on the 
Black Spur Road was also lowered by reducing travel times and driver fatigue and lessening 
the difficulty of the transportation route.  This also lessened the risk of spilling the 
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contaminated waste in a crash.  Many of the community members interviewed identified the 
truck travel along the Black Spur as a significant concern.  Some also experienced near 
misses personally.  
 
While reducing truck movements on the Black Spur, trucks movements in the affected region 
were increased.  Due to the high number of displaced people in the affected areas it is 
unlikely that the additional truck movements would have made a significant impact on the 
community.  According to Murrindindi Shire Council, only a handful of complaints were 
received about the speed of truck travel in the area. 
 
The landfill was staffed by three persons – two Grocon staff and a Council employee all with 
previous experience operating a landfill. The use of trained staff was an important mitigation 
measure to reduce the health and safety risk to personnel operating the landfill and truck 
drivers offloading waste. 
 
 
6.5.8 Summary 
Overall, the construction of the new landfill cell was a success.  The fast design, construction 
and consenting process showed good collaboration between organisations.  The new landfill 
significantly reduced health and safety risk to the public and the truck drivers and reduced 
haulage costs.  Environmentally, the landfill cell is relatively low risk.  However, the execution 
of the new landfill siting and consenting could have been improved.  The assessment 
process and justification for the reduced environmental standards (based on a health and 
safety risk) was unclear.  In addition, the authors believe the expedited ‘peace-time’ 
processes for consenting has the potential to introduce future liability issues at the site.  
 
Table 6-5 summarises the strengths and weaknesses of the construction of the new landfill 
cell in Murrindindi Shire.   
 
Table 6-5 Bushfire landfill construction assessment summary 
 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Or
ga
nis
ati
on
al • No impact on Shire resources. • Limited Shire resources available to monitor operations of their site, if 
desired. 
Le
ga
l 
 • Liability transferred to Local Council 
who had limited involvement in 
construction and management of landfill 
during acceptance of bushfire waste. 
• Questionable use of ‘peace-time’ 
regulations and expedited processes for 
an emergency. 
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En
vir
on
me
nta
l • Reduced carbon emissions by reduced transportation distances. 
• Landfill operations staff with previous 
landfill management experience with 
skills to identify and mitigate potential 
environmental risks. 
 
 
• Higher environmental risk due to limited 
assessment of effects possible in such 
short time  
 
Ec
on
om
ic • Reduced travel costs. • Additional cost for landfill construction. 
So
cia
l 
• Reduced public safety risk by 
reducing truck trips on Black Spur. 
• Reduced health and safety risk in 
transportation of wastes. 
• Reduced driver fatigue by shortening 
travel distances. 
• Landfill operations staff with previous 
landfill management experience – 
reduces health and safety risk. 
 
• Increased traffic movement in affected 
area. 
 
 
 
 
6.6 Communication 
An overriding theme within all the above decisions is communication.  This includes 
communication:  
• to gather information to assist in decision-making;  
• to facilitate decision-making (particularly inter-agency communication);  
• to inform the public on how decisions were made; and  
• to educate on how the outcome of the decision will be implemented. 
 
In general, inter-agency communication for information gathering, sharing, analysis and 
decision-making was reactionary but effective.  In terms of waste management, there were 
no pre-disaster communication plans in place.  Roles and responsibilities were undefined 
and overall responsibilities for various aspects of the waste management process were 
unclear.  Despite the relative success of the response to this event, planning for inter-agency 
organisation and communication would greatly improve the decision-making process. 
 
Communication of the waste management decisions with the public, however, was poor, 
despite efforts by VBRRA.  The State Emergency Recovery Plan (Emergency Management 
in Victoria, 2005) outlines that community communication plans should be established ‘as 
soon as practicable’ in the recovery process.  Despite this no community-wide consultation 
was carried out prior to establishment of the clean-up programme or during implementation.  
EPA and local councils offered informal community information services.  Interestingly, 
according to Wheelan (EPA), 95% of the time EPA reported they were managing emotion 
rather than technical questions. 
 
Consequently there was a general lack of awareness of: 
a) Health and safety procedures for independent clean-up. 
b) Waste disposal options for individual clean-up. 
c) Who funded the demolition and debris removal programme.  
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d) How Grocon was awarded the contract (even amongst various government officials). 
e) The level of recycling carried out and the reinvestment of the recycling profits into the 
community. 
f) Efforts to use local labour and the associated challenges in doing this.  
g) The availability of mulch for erosion protection etc. 
 
Effective communication may have short-circuited some community dissatisfaction, mitigated 
potential health and safety concerns (for individual clean-up) and potential environmental 
impacts through improper waste disposal.  
 
 
 
 
7 Planning for the future 
7.1 Existing attitudes on disaster waste management plans 
The majority of the professionals we spoke to who were involved in the bushfire waste 
management response expressed that they did not believe a generic debris management 
plan could be generated prior to an event.  Many felt there were lessons to be learnt but did 
not see the importance of documenting them for a future response.  It is interesting to note 
that no previous experience was used (in terms of reports or personnel) from the Canberra 
2003 fires prior to implementation of this clean-up as VBRRA felt that the situation in 
Canberra was too different to the 2009 fires.  This reluctance to plan for and effectively 
mitigate bushfire risk in Australia has also been noted by other authors (Underwood, 2009).  
Most respondents also expressed that they would not position their organisation any 
differently to heighten their preparedness for debris management after a future disaster.  It is 
understood, however, that VBRRA is currently working to compile lessons learnt from this 
disaster for integration into plans for future disaster responses. 
 
Several of the private companies expressed that their involvement was mainly due to good 
commercial citizenship but would not have taken on a level of work that would disrupt their 
day to day operations.  Most companies carry spare capacity as part of their normal business 
but would not consider carrying additional capacity for dealing with low probability events.  
However, some companies expressed that they would be open to having stand-by contracts 
for disaster response (subject to conditions). 
 
For local authorities it was generally unclear as to what would have happened if the 
government had not established the Grocon contract.  Most local authorities had no disaster 
waste policy or plan in place, particularly for private property clearance.  There is a move by 
emergency managers in the respective councils to actively build relationships and develop a 
resource sharing for disaster response.  Memorandums of understanding already exist 
between neighbouring councils and are used for personnel and equipment sharing in 
emergencies but nothing has been specifically developed for waste management  
 
State MP Ben Hardman noted that, in general, municipal emergency response plans and 
state wide emergency plans were in place but these were not wholly adequate in this case.  
The scale of this disaster just had not been anticipated in the preparation of these plans.  
Any future guidelines made would need to be flexible to mould to any scale / type of disaster. 
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7.2 Recommendations for future disaster waste management 
It is unfortunate, that even in the wake of such a disaster, that organisations still fail to realise 
the benefit of planning.  Given the acknowledgement that lessons have been learnt, the 
reluctance to plan for future disasters was surprising.  There are several possible reasons for 
this viewpoint: 
- The perceived difficulty in planning for the unknown. 
- The low frequency of such large scale disasters. 
- The success of this particular debris management process (implemented 
without a plan in place). 
 
The first step in planning for disaster waste management is consequently transcending the 
paradigm that planning is not possible or useful.  The analysis in this report has highlighted 
areas where planning, in particular decision-making guidance, may have assisted the 
response. 
 
A possible approach is to develop the plan around decision points.  This can be achieved by 
anticipating: what decisions will need to be made, who should make the decision, what 
information will be needed, how the decision will be made; and how the decision will be 
communicated and then implemented.  This approach may be more effective than instituting 
operational plans which may not be appropriate for every disaster situation. 
 
 
Commonwealth / State Government level 
• Determine a government funding policy on disaster waste management - either a 
blanket policy or a tiered approach based on disaster impact.   
• Define the role of insurance and include insurance operators in the development of 
the above funding strategy. 
• Establish a demolition and debris removal strategy (physical works), alongside the 
funding strategy above.  Consider state vs local approach, property owner roles and 
responsibilities, scope of works, provisions for property owners outside scope of 
works.  Again a tiered approach relative to disaster impact is best. 
• Establish service contracts for demolition and waste removal for different levels of 
disaster response above – including contractors, landfill disposal, recyclers etc. 
where possible. 
• Establish a disaster waste management organisational structure including roles and 
responsibilities at all levels of government and including community representatives 
and how this structure fits within the overall recovery framework.  The inclusion / 
consultation of personnel involved in strategic long-term waste management is 
important. 
• Review emergency legislative provisions for managing disaster waste, in particular: 
o Liability and prosecution issues. 
o Private property clearance for acute and/or chronic hazards without owner 
consent.  
• Develop a policy on community communication for: 
o  Waste management programme design, to aid post-disaster decision-making 
including for protocols for use of local labour. 
o Programme implementation at time of disaster 
o Public awareness on financial preparedness for disaster waste management 
 
 
Environmental and Health & Safety authorities 
• Establish environmental and health and safety information gathering and risk 
assessment processes for a post disaster situation. 
• Establish guidelines on decision-making processes post-disaster, including: 
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o Cross-agency liaison strategy (EPA, DHS, VicRoads etc) 
o Clear delegation of authority for decision-making within organisations. 
o Regulatory support for decision-makers (liability and prosecution protection 
within emergency legislation). 
o Minimal acceptable environmental and health and safety risks for different 
levels of disaster impact and/or development of a transparent process for 
assessing risks post-disaster and translating that assessment into the 
programme implementation. 
o Guidelines for the appropriate use of recycling in disaster waste management. 
• Establish a post-disaster communication plan for dissemination of environmental and 
H&S information for those carrying out their own clean-up. 
 
 
Local authorities 
• Establish memorandum of understandings with neighbouring authorities for sharing of 
resources. 
• Prepare and share resource register including personal, facilities, plant and 
equipment. 
• Prepare local disaster waste management plans including provisions for residents 
when no government funding is available and/or for works outside the scope of a 
government or municipal clean-up programme. 
• Review regulatory processes for private property clearance for acute and/or chronic 
hazards without owner consent (in the event of no government funding for private 
property clearance).  
• Establish service contracts for demolition and waste removal – including contractors, 
landfill disposal etc. where possible, for different levels of disaster response. 
• Develop a policy on community communication for: 
o  Waste management programme design, to aid post-disaster decision-making 
including for protocols for use of local labour. 
o Programme implementation at time of disaster 
o Public awareness on financial preparedness for disaster waste management 
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Appendix A 
• Data gathering 
August reconnaissance 
Team 
The reconnaissance team comprised: 
• Suzanne Wilkinson 
• Tom Charleson 
• Greg Edwards 
• James Beckett 
• Alice Chang (all University of Auckland) 
• Regan Potangaroa (Auckland Unitec) 
• Charlotte Brown (University of Canterbury) 
Funding 
The funding for the trip came from the Resilient Organisations programme – a collaborative 
effort between University of Canterbury, University of Auckland and Kestrel Group, which is 
looking at recovery from hazard events. 
Reconnaissance Programme 
The reconnaissance programme is shown in the table below.  Note all references to persons 
or organisations came from information obtained in the below interviews, unless stated 
otherwise. 
 
Victorian Bushfire August Reconnaissance Programme 
 
Time and Date Person Position & Organisation 
11am  
7 August 2009 
Tim Bamford Contract Administrator’s Representative 
Victorian Bushfire Recovery and Reconstruction 
Authority (VBRRA)  
10am  
10 August 2009 
Frank Bortoletto Executive Project Manager 
Grocon  
2pm  
10 August 2009 
Michael 
O’Keeffe 
Post Collection Manager 
Sita Environmental Solutions 
11:30am  
11 August 2009 
Grant Jack Manager 
Asset Maintenance & Services 
Shire of Yarra Ranges 
2pm 
11 August 2009 
Ben Harries Team Leader 
Environmental Operations Infrastructure 
City of Whittlesea 
10am 
12 August 2009 
Myles Whelan Client Relationship Manager 
Victorian Environmental Protection Agency 
9am 
13 August 2009 
Matt Nind Regional Manager 
Solid Waste Division 
Transpacific Industries Group Ltd 
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March reconnaissance 
Team 
Charlotte Brown was the sole researcher on this reconnaissance trip. 
 
Funding 
Funding for this work was by the University of Canterbury, Department of Civil and Natural 
Resources Engineering, departmental research fund. 
 
Programme 
The research programme for this work was carried out between the 12th and 21st of March 
2010.  14 community members were interviewed and 6 completed a questionnaire.  In 
addition to community interviews, 2 government representatives for the area and a Council 
representative from Murrindindi Shire were also interviewed, as shown in the table below. 
 
Victorian Bushfire March Reconnaissance Programme 
 
Time and Date Person Position & Organisation 
3pm  
17 March 2010 
Ben Hardman State MP for Seymour 
11am 
18 march 2010 
Darren Ritchie Co-ordinator Waste Management  
Murrindindi Shire 
3pm 
19 March 2010 
Fran Bailey Federal MP for McEwen  
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Appendix B 
• Victorian Emergency legal provisions related to waste 
management 
 
There were two main pieces of emergency legislation used to facilitate the demolition and 
debris removal works: 
• Section 30A of the Victorian Environmental Protection Act 1970 
• Section 55 of the Dangerous Goods Act 1985 
 
The provisions are valid for 120 days and 6 months respectively.  The Section 30A was 
renewed once during the clean-up works. 
 
Verbatim, these Acts respectively state: 
 
Victorian Environmental Protection Act 1970 
 
30A. Authority may authorise emergency storage, use etc. of waste 
(1)  Despite anything to the contrary in this Act, the Authority may approve-  
(b) the storage, treatment, handling or disposal of waste on or from any premises. 
(1A) The Authority may only grant its approval under this section for the purposes of –  
(a) meeting a temporary emergency; or 
(b) providing for the temporary relief of a public nuisance or community hardship; or 
 
Dangerous Goods Act 1985 
 
55 Governor in Council may make Order with respect to dangerous goods 
(1) The Governor in Council may by Order published in the Government Gazette prohibit 
absolutely or subject to conditions or restrictions the manufacture, storage, supply, transfer, 
transport, sale or use of any dangerous goods when in the opinion of the Governor in Council 
it is expedient for the public safety to make the Order. 
(2) A person who contravenes an Order made under subsection (1) is guilty of an offence. 
 
 
 
 
